My aim in this paper is to examine
how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the ‘body without organs’ (hereon BwO),
leads us back to Deleuze’s encounter with Spinoza’s Ethics (1677). It is in this encounter that we see Deleuze
emphasise an account of ‘Anticartesianism’, which is expressed in a similar
method to the BwO’s overcoming of the psychoanalytic discourse which it
endeavours to destabilise. My intention is to not unwieldly explore the BwO and
psychanalysis through a lens of Spinoza, but to uncover the prerequisite metaphysics
which are at work in Deleuze’s earlier philosophy which advances into the BwO. I
aim to show how these two readings are linked and why it is necessary for them
to be brought together.
The BwO is without a doubt linked
to Spinoza and this line of questioning is perhaps obvious at first glance; we
can see this in Anti-Oedipus where
Deleuze and Guattari write:
The body without
organs is the immanent substance, in the most Spinozist sense of the word; and
the partial objects are like its ultimate attributes[1].
And we also find another direct reference
of the BwO to Spinoza in A Thousand
Plateaus, wherein they write:
After all, is
not Spinoza’s Ethics the great book
of the BwO? The attributes are types of genuses of BwO’s, substances, powers,
zero intensities as matrices of production. The modes are everything that comes
to pass: waves and vibrations, migrations, thresholds and gradients,
intensities produced in a given type of substance starting from a given matrix[2].
If we are to follow Deleuze and
Guattari’s instructions, we would find ourselves back at Spinoza’s Ethics. However, this is not quite a
simple task of saying that the BwO is like
God (substance), it is not quite as simple as transposing Spinozist terms on to
the BwO. To see how these two constructs fit together, we need to see what Deleuze
finds in Spinoza, and how Spinozism functions as an impulse within a
philosophical system. I will show how, following what Gillian Howie writes (but
doesn’t take any further), that the fully worked out system of ‘immanent
substance’ later becomes ‘the body without organs’[3].
Although there are a few technical developments between these two systems, Spinozism
provides Deleuze and Guattari with a course of philosophy which is dangerous
yet revolutionary, one which destabilises the organising power of the humanist
tradition.
My method of inquiry will follow as
such; I will first discuss Descartes metaphysical system of substance which
inevitably leads him to ‘substance dualism’, whereby we see the mind and body
problem of interaction. Spinoza undertakes this system and advances
Cartesianism towards ‘substance monism’; which offers a path away from the
problematic of dualism.
I will secondly be looking at
Deleuze’s own encounter with Spinoza; between the texts Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1968) (hereon Expressionism) and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1970) (hereon Practical Philosophy). My first aim will be to put together what
Deleuze calls a ‘plane of immanence or consistency’, which is developed from a
reading of Spinoza. Deleuze, through this reading, rejects all transcendental
notions of being; this includes the idea of God as transient cause.
I will then be looking at Deleuze
and Guattari’s BwO, I will follow mainly the account given in A Thousand Plateaus, specifically the
chapter How do you Make Yourself a Body
Without Organs, however I will bring Anti-Oedipus
in to support some of their more abstract claims. I will draw out comparisons
between what Deleuze says in Practical
Philosophy and A Thousand Plateaus
for the purpose of showing how the BwO composes the plane, that the
plane of immanence is a precondition of the BwO. In establishing Spinoza’s
significance, it will become clear to see why Deleuze adopts a Spinozist
reading into the BwO. Deleuze and Guattari seek a radical philosophy, one which
opposes the dominant theory of the time or breaks out of the parameters of
philosophy. For example, Anti-Oedipus
was written in a response to the events in May ’68. Deleuze tells us that these
events revealed something about desire, that ‘the people who hate ’68, or say
it was a mistake, see it as something symbolic or imaginary. But that’s
precisely what it wasn’t; it was reality breaking through’. Psychoanalysis had
its claws deeply embedded into all focus on desire in the early 20th
century. Deleuze and Guattari set out in Anti-Oedipus
to free desire from psychoanalysis, to do so they need to develop a positive
conception of it. They do so through the system of immanence[4]
which Deleuze says posits the ‘univocity of the real’, and goes on to say that
the text is a ‘sort of Spinozism of the unconscious’[5].
The timing of Deleuze’s interest and the resurgence of Spinoza appears to
correspond to a growing climate of anti-humanism. Pierre Macherey considers
that Deleuze’s instance on Spinoza against Descartes, or Anticartesianism,
makes Spinoza ‘a radical critic of the illusions of subjectivity and
consciousness in which the contrasting Postcartesianism of French-style
phenomenology had been steeped’[6].
Deleuze’s Spinozism provides an important background for the BwO; one which
makes way for a philosophy whereby there is an equality of all being, a
univocity of reality and a condition of Being in its full positivity[7].
Descartes: Substance, Attributes, Dualism.
In this section, I will explain Descartes’
metaphysical claims on the subject of substance and how it leads him towards
the dualism between the mind and the body. I will be following Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy (hereon Principles), the terminology of which is
continued by Spinoza in Part I of the Ethics.
Spinoza’s metaphysics is at once sympathetic with Descartes, and yet Spinoza
claims that Descartes had not gone far enough in his own system[8].
For Spinoza, Descartes had not taken his principles to its fullest and most
logical conclusion; which as we will see in Ethics
Spinoza draws out these conclusions. Spinoza works within Descartes’ system,
reconstructing and showing its inevitable consequences.
Descartes begins his metaphysical
exposition by explaining how substance is that which requires ‘no other thing’
for its existence[9],
he writes at proposition 1.51 in the Principles:
‘By substance we can understand nothing
other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing
for its existence’ […][10]
What Descartes means here is that
substance is the limit, it requires no other thing for its existence, it
depends only on itself. There can only be one substance since its existence is
independent of all other things. Descartes tells us that this substance, which
exists independently, is God[11].
For Descartes, substance which requires no other thing for its existence is
God, however he will tell us that there are also substances which require God
for their existence. The notion is considered initially in proposition 51, contending
that ‘in the case of all other substances, we perceive they can exist only with
the help of God’s concurrence’[12].
These are perhaps better called ‘created substances’.
In Descartes Second Set of Replies (hereon Replies)
to the Meditations, we see similarities
which help elucidate and support the argument on created substances. According
to Descartes, he confirms that there is one independent substance, of which its
nature includes to ‘subsist on [its] own’[13].
Descartes considers what he calls a ‘complete substance’ to be completely independent,
or that a substance is complete ‘when it is considered on its own’[14].
On the other hand, for Descartes, an ‘incomplete substance’ does not possess
the ‘power to subsist on [its] own’, that is, ‘it is incomplete in so far as it
is referred to some other substance in conjunction with which it forms
something which is a unity in its own right’[15].
In Descartes’ metaphysical system, it follows that:
(i)
A thing whose existence requires no other being
is substance (God).
(ii)
A thing whose existence is dependent on nothing
other than God are created substances.[16]
There are degrees of independence
in terms of substance, God is completely independent. Following this, within
the universe that God has created are ‘entities of existence’ which depend only
on God, these lesser substances are the ultimate constituents of the world’[17].
Descartes does not continue the discussion of substance in terms of independent
existence any further in Principles,
but goes on to the discussion of how it is that substance is conceived. This
will lead to the consideration of substance dualism. That is, there are only
two principal attributes in Descartes system; thought and extension.
Following proposition 51 of the Principles, Descartes tells us that created
things, ‘are of such a nature that they cannot exist without other things,
whilst some need only the ordinary concurrence of God in order to exist’, and
that most importantly, ‘we make the distinction by calling the latter
‘substances’ and the former ‘qualities’ or ‘attributes’ of those substances’[18].
What for Descartes are attributes in relation to substance?
We can see in proposition 1.53 that
‘to each substance there belongs one principal attribute’[19].
The relation of attribute to its substance follows that we cannot ‘initially
become aware of a substance merely through its being an existing thing’, since
for itself, substance has no effect on us. However, ‘we can come to know a
substance by one of its attributes’[20].
Descartes means that a substance which underpins reality or is the foundations
of reality, can only be conceived through its attributes or qualities.
Descartes tells us in proposition 1.52 for example, that ‘nothingness possesses
no attributes’[21];
therefore, nothingness cannot be truly conceived, perceived or known
considering that nothingness does not possess the quality of existence. The
nature of nothingness is not to exist and has no essence which can be expressed
through an attribute. He tells us contrary to the notion of nothingness that
‘if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must
also be present an existing thing or substance to which it be attributed’[22].
Earlier, I discussed the notion of
created substances which are dependent on God. Woolhouse makes a further claim
by asking the question ‘whether there are things which depend not only on God’
(as the created substances depend solely on), but whether there are things
which depend on created substances?[23]
Continuing this line of inquiry, God is independent, requiring no other thing
for its existence, created substances depend on God for their existence and
attributes or qualities depend on the created substance ‘whose attributes and
qualities they are’[24].
We can begin to see the various degrees of reality[25],
from the metaphysical realm of substance and how it is we come to know them
through their attributes which are expressed in the corporeal or physical
realm.
If we can begin to know of the
substance whose attributes are attributed, then what constitutes an attribute
to its relevant substance, that is to say, following Descartes’ terminology,
what principal property constitutes the nature and essence of each substance?
According to Descartes in
proposition 1.52, substance applies to ‘mind and to body’[26],
and in proposition 1.53 the principal attribute of mind is ‘thought’, and in
the case of body Descartes tells us its principal attribute is ‘extension’[27].
So, the essence of mind is thought and the essence of body is extension[28].
It appears that in considering that there are two attributes, thought and
extension, there are consequently two kinds of created substance, mind and
body. Extension for Descartes as he writes at proposition 1.53, is ‘length,
breadth and depth’, which ‘constitutes the nature of corporeal substance’.
Likewise, thought is anything which ‘constitutes the nature of thinking
substance’[29],
which could be regarded as being imagination and rationality. Or, as Descartes
writes at proposition 1.53, ‘imagination, sensation and [the] will are
intelligible only in a thinking thing’[30],
which corresponds to the thinking subject. The stance that substance can only
be known through its attributes is echoed in Descartes’ Replies, whereby he writes:
We do not have
immediate knowledge of substances […] we know them only be perceiving certain
forms or attributes which must inhere in something if they are to exist; and we
call the thing in which they inhere a ‘substance’.[31]
What I believe is at stake between
the Principles and the Replies, at least which correlates to
Descartes’ metaphysics, is that we cannot fully understand an extended
substance apart from its being extended, that it is a special property of which
‘constitute[‘s] the nature’[32]
(1.63) of a substance which is extended[33].
This consideration of there being two created substances, mind and body, leads
us to think of Descartes’ system to be substance dualism. Descartes has
separated the mind and the body to show how it is that they are capable of
existing apart. Descartes takes this stance throughout his work. In his last
work for example; The Passions of the
Soul, Descartes tells us that the soul (which is relative to the mind),
although it is ‘joined to the body’[34],
the soul likewise has ‘no relation to extension, or other properties of the
matter of which the body is composed’. The work was a response to correspondence
between Descartes and Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618-80), who questioned
Descartes on how it comes to be that the soul can be governed by the body given
that they have nothing in common[35].
Outlining the problematic nature of dualism as espoused in Descartes
metaphysical system. One benefit of this dualism provides Descartes with a
careful and calm reply to the question of the immortality of the soul. That
bodily death is not the annihilation of the substance of mind, and by keeping
the soul incorporeal or separate from the body, he is able to maintain
theological stability[36].
Spinoza; Substance, Attributes and Substance Monism.
I will now be outlining Spinoza’s
contribution to the consideration of substance, which both echoes and
differentiates from Descartes’ metaphysical system. Spinoza leads Descartes’
system to its monistic conclusion. Descartes was under the pressure of the
church and committed to theological stability. Whereas Spinoza is under no
pretension and shows that Descartes system without a doubt leads to the
conclusion of a naturalistic metaphysics. Spinoza begins Ethics initially on the subject of substance; in Part I Concerning God, Spinoza opens with
definitions, the third of which tells us:
By substance I
mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the
conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which
it has to be formed[37].
(1Def3)
Spinoza contends that substance is
‘in itself’, which follows Descartes’ definition of substance as existing
independently. Before continuing to analyse Spinoza’s consideration of
substance as both ‘in itself’ and ‘conceived through itself’[38],
it is important to also look at the following definition of attribute, as
Woolhouse tells us, 1Def3 is ‘empty and merely [a] formal characterisation of
substance’[39]
without defining the relationship of attributes. Following this we can see in
1Def4 whereby Spinoza writes:
By attribute I
mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its
essence[40].
(1Def4)
What Spinoza means by this
definition follows Descartes’ notion of attributes. That attributes are related
to the essence of substance[41];
should a substance not have any attributes then it could not be understood or
conceived. It is in virtue of attributes that a substance can be understood or
have essence, and therefore for Spinoza, each substance must have at least one
attribute[42].
Given that a substance is ‘in
itself’, then by virtue of having attributes, we can begin to see how substance
can be conceived through itself[43].
Following Descartes’ own description of attributes and their relation to
substance in Principles 1.63, we are
hardly to understand substance on its own if we are to exclude the attributes
of thought or extension[44].
Spinoza appears to agree with Descartes’ framework regarding the encounter of
attribute in relation to substance[45].
An attribute, as Spinoza says, constitutes a substance’s nature[46].
Substance is a self-supporting and individual entity which echoes Descartes’
independent substance, and likewise Spinoza follows by writing that an
‘attribute is that which [the] intellect perceives of substance’[47]
(1P10). Following this, attributes are essential properties of substances, that
is, they constitute the substances which they characterise[48].
As Woolhouse quite succinctly
suggests, the notion of substance being both ‘in itself’ and ‘conceived through
itself’ are two characteristics which are ‘different sides of the same coin’[49],
that to conceive of substance as ‘in itself’, is to make explicit our
understanding of whether or not a substance can exist or be in itself all the
same[50].
If substance is given, then it follows too that attributes are given[51].
Spinoza agrees with Descartes that attributes are properties of substance by
1Def4, all things are either in themselves or in something else by 1Ax1, and
that substance exists and is God by 1Def6.
Spinoza accepts and carries forward
parts of the Cartesian system whilst differentiating or rejecting others[52].
Spinoza rejects the notion that there are created substances[53],
in 1P6 Spinoza writes that ‘one substance cannot be produced by another
substance’[54].
He then goes on to claim at 1P7 that ‘existence belongs to the nature of
substance’, which follows that substance is ‘self-caused’, which means that God
as substance has the power to bring about its own being[55].
Substance cannot produce any other substance by 1P6, and so, substance must be
the cause of itself by 1P7, which follows that God or substance did not come
into being by the power of another substance as this could infinitely regress.
Rather, the existence of God or substance has no beginning and no end, its
essence is existence, or its existence belongs to the nature of substance
(1P7), which means that substance can never not-exist; it has neither start nor
finish. It would be contradictory and reductive for Spinoza to admit that
substances can create other substance, as it would lead towards the contention
that substance thing could have been caused by a prior, superior substance ad
infinitum.
For Spinoza, God as a substance, consists
of ‘infinite attributes’[56]
(1def6), which breaks away from Descartes, who tells us that there are only two
principal attributes[57]:
thought and extension. However, Spinoza does agree that both thought and
extension are two of God’s infinite attributes, but the notion does not exhaust
infinite attributes to only these two. Spinoza tells us at 2P1 that ‘thought is
an attribute of God; i.e. God is a thinking thing’, and at 2P2 that ‘extension
is an attribute of God, i.e. God is an extended thing’[58].
We know that God is a thinking thing because ‘man thinks’ (2ax2) and we know
that God is an ‘extended thing’ because ‘we feel a certain body to be affected
in many ways’[59]
(2ax4). So, for Descartes there are just two attributes, thought and extension.
For Spinoza, God is a ‘substance consisting of an infinity of attributes’[60]
(1def6), God contains all possible attributes, and as Woolhouse suggests,
infinite substance ‘need not involve more than the Cartesian two’[61].
The collapse of Cartesian dualism is beginning to take its form in Spinoza’s
system. Leading me to discuss now how for Spinoza everything flows from and
depends on God, and the reason for which Spinoza is considered a substance
monist. The notion comes from proposition 1P14, and subsequent propositions
which lead him towards this, whereby Spinoza writes:
There can be, or
be conceived, no other substance but God.[62]
(1p14)
Following this statement are
propositions which together follow Spinoza’s substance monism, whereby there is
only one substance, which is God, and that everything else are attributes which
depend on God[63].
For Spinoza to get to this statement, he offers two proofs such that there must
only be at most one substance per attribute[64],
secondly, Spinoza must then demonstrate that there is only one substance for
all attributes[65].
For Spinoza, God exists
necessarily, or as he writes at 1P11, ‘God’ consists of ‘infinite attributes’
and ‘necessarily exists’[66]
(1P11). For Spinoza, there can only be at most one substance per attribute. By
1P2, ‘two substances’ which inhere ‘different attributes’ have ‘nothing in
common’[67],
that by 1Def3, each substance must be in itself. However, the argument leads
towards 1P5, where Spinoza explicitly writes ‘in the universe there cannot be
two or more substances of the same nature or attribute’[68]
(1P5). What is at stake here is that, should two substances share the same
attribute, then there is no way to differentiate between the two substances[69].
As we saw at 1Def4, an attribute constitutes the essence of a substance, and
therefore it would be absurd for two substances to share the same attribute as
it would be that two substances are indistinguishable from each other. If this
is the case then would it not be simply that these two substances are not in
fact one?
The argument is as follows;
substance is distinguished through a difference in attributes, or two
substances are differentiated by their individual and separate attributes. We
can find this argument in 1P4 where Spinoza tells us that ‘two or more distinct
things are distinguished from one another either by the difference of the
attributes of the substances’[70].
If, however, two different substances share the same attribute, then these
substances are not indistinguishable and therefore identical[71].
Hence it follows, in 1P5 that if two or more substances be distinguished by
their attributes then ‘there cannot be several such substances but only one’[72].
Two or more substances cannot share the same nature or attribute. This
satisfies the first argument that there can be at most one substance per
attribute. Secondly then, we need to see how Spinoza presents the argument that
there is one substance for all attributes[73].
Spinoza provides the argument for
one substance for all attributes by suggesting that ‘God, or substance’,
consists of ‘infinite attributes’ (1P11). For Spinoza, there is a substance
that by definition has all attributes[74].
Spinoza has already told us at 1Def6 that God is an ‘absolutely infinite being’
which is likewise ‘substance consisting of infinite attributes’[75].
Should there be one substance which consists of infinite attributes then,
following the previous argument that there cannot be two substances which share
the same attribute, a substance consisting of infinite attributes implies that
there remain no attributes left to distinguish any further substance[76].
So, by Spinoza, an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a
substance (a substance must have at least one attribute) (1Def4). There
likewise cannot be two substances which share the same attribute (1P5), for
distinct substances are differentiated by their attributes. Spinoza then tells
us by 1Def6 and 1P11 that God or substance consists of infinite attributes, and
that God necessarily exists. If God has infinite attributes then there can be
no other substance for it would need to share at least one attribute with God,
as Spinoza writes:
[…] if there
were any other substance but God, it would have to be explicated through some
attribute of God, and so there would exist two substances with the same
attribute, which is absurd[77].
(1p14)
This follows Spinoza’s contention
that any other substance other than God would have to share an attribute of
God, and as it would make it indistinguishable to God then there can be
conceived no other substance other than God by 1P14. So then, we have the
initial argument which leads us towards Spinoza’s substance monism of 1P14,
that there can only be one substance with an infinite number of attributes,
which is God.
From these definitions and
propositions, we begin to see how Spinoza has demonstrated fundamental problems
in Descartes philosophical system. Spinoza offers a philosophical system which
pushes Cartesianism and draws out monistic conclusions. As we will now see with
Deleuze’s encounter of ‘immanence’, there is a notion that Spinoza is parasitic
to Cartesianism and drives it towards dangerous territory, or advances it past
all its inadequacies.
Deleuze and Spinoza; A
Plane of Immanence.
In this section, I will look to see
how Deleuze elaborates the philosophical system of immanence which he locates
in Spinoza’s Ethics. As to not forge
an answer straight from Deleuze, I will provide a reading of Deleuze’s meaning
in conjunction with Spinoza. The purpose of which will provide an elaboration
on Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza which otherwise may appear abstract without
providing the depth which he finds in the Ethics.
Deleuze makes an interesting claim;
when an idea is to “encounter” another idea, it happens that the two relations
sometimes combine to create a larger and more powerful whole. Whereas,
sometimes one idea decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts[78].
What is interesting here is not only that Spinoza perhaps advances Descartes,
but that Deleuze later, goes on to say how Spinoza ‘belongs to that line of
“private thinkers” who overturns values and constructs their philosophy with
hammer blows’[79]. This
reference clearly brings together Spinoza and Nietzsche, considering
Nietzsche’s ‘craft’ for overthrowing the idols, whereby he finds in metaphysics
a deprivation of reality, value, meaning and truthfulness; and aims to collapse
its distinction[80].
Deleuze thinks no less of Spinoza than he does of Nietzsche, and though he is
not claiming here that Spinoza is a primitive form of Nietzscheanism, but it
seems as though he considers Spinoza parasitic to philosophy. Whereby Spinoza
embeds himself into Descartes’ metaphysical system and accelerates it towards damaging
conclusions. What Spinoza does for Deleuze is he teaches ‘the philosopher how
to become a nonphilosopher’[81].
Deleuze loads up Spinoza as a model, one which is combined with Nietzsche to
form a whole part which can embed itself into philosophy and work its way back
out, degrading or immobilising binary modes of thought. As we have seen between
Spinoza and Descartes’ metaphysical theory of substance. Deleuze acknowledges
this in Practical Philosophy, rather
than thinking that Spinoza completely rejects Cartesianism and moves away from
it, he is in fact parasitic to the metaphysics, Deleuze writes:
Cartesianism was
never the thinking of Spinoza: it was more like his rhetoric; he uses it as the
rhetoric he needs[82].
Deleuze is aware that Spinoza feels
obliged to follow Descartes, but Spinoza amplifies or maximises Descartes’
metaphysical system. Deleuze is making a much bolder claim, referring to
Spinoza as a ‘nonphilosopher’ and making connections between Spinoza and
Nietzsche. However, there is some truth in that Spinoza does take Descartes’
principles into the dangerous territory of naturalistic metaphysics
(naturalising God / proving Nature divine). If Descartes would have been
consistent to his principles, he would have arrived at the same naturalistic
metaphysics that Spinoza expounded in the Ethics.
Descartes made Spinozism possible in leaving difficult questions unresolved in
his metaphysics. It could be that Descartes was under pressure to oblige
theological politics and to accommodate Christian beliefs surrounding God,
freedom and immortality[83].
Spinoza clearly has no concerns, we can see the completion of Descartes’
metaphysics of substance in its definitive form within the Ethics. Spinoza, according to Deleuze, advances beyond Cartesianism[84].
Index of the Main Concepts of The Ethics:
In chapter four of Practical Philosophy, Index of the Main Concepts of The Ethics,
Deleuze arranges Spinozist terms alphabetically and includes definitions. If we
look towards Spinoza’s use of the geometric method as identified in the Ethics the reader will not arrive at the
same conclusions which is espoused in Descartes’ metaphysical system[85].
Deleuze in reordering Spinozist terms is subverting the method, in a way to
adapt the system for his own purpose. For Deleuze, the works of Spinoza provide
him not with merely a conceptual framework but ‘a set of affects, a kinetic
determination [and] an impulse’[86].
Spinoza provides us with a description of Method in the Treatise on the emendation of the Intellect (1677), whereby he
writes that method is the way that truth should be sought in the ‘proper
order’; to get to the truth then it is in virtue of distinguishing its nature
from the rest of the perceptions. Spinoza writes:
[…] by
investigating its nature, so that from that we may come to know our power of
understanding and so restrain the mind that it understands, according to
constructing certain rules as aids, so that the mind does not weary itself in
knowledge, or an idea of an idea; and because there is no idea of an idea,
unless there is first an idea, there will be no Method unless there is first an
idea. So that Method will be good which shows how the mind is to be directed
according the standard of a given true idea[87].
(TdlE 36-8)
Through a geometrical arrangement
Spinoza can provide empirical demonstrations of the ontological argument for
God’s existence[88].
That if the existence of God is the result of the philosophical system, Spinoza
through this method can arrive at this conclusion, leading from the corporeal
world back to these metaphysical distinctions. We see this clearly in Part I of
the Ethics, where God serves as the
foundation for the deductive construction of the entire philosophical system[89].
It follows that through this method, Spinoza shows us that the world has order,
that through this arrangement will allow us to know the metaphysical
underpinnings of reality.
Spinoza unfolds this philosophical
system by breaking it down into definitions, axioms, propositions and proofs,
rather than provide a discursive elaboration of the philosophical system, as
Deleuze writes in Expressionism, that
Spinoza’s ‘method is based on the possibility of linking ideas one to another
in a chain, one being the “complete cause” of another[90].
The framework that Spinoza favours can be thought of as a sequence, and as
Deleuze points out, are linked together as if a chain, with additional comments
(scholia), prefaces and appendices which stand in a looser style[91].
Deleuze writes that the Ethics is a
‘book written twice simultaneously’, that on the one hand we have that
interlocked chain of definitions, propositions and demonstrations, whilst on
the other is a broken chain of scholia[92].
The first develop speculative themes, whilst the second cuts across ‘expressing
all the angers of the heart and setting forth the practical theses of
denunciation and liberation’[93].
What is interesting for Deleuze is that there is a hermeneutic role that is
played out in Spinoza; whilst it demonstrates rationality in a locked chain,
beneath the surface it reveals an expression of disordered flashes[94].
I question the relevance of the geometrical method with Deleuze’s
interpretation, whereby he arranges Spinozist concepts and terminology into the
structure of a dictionary. In doing so, he is able to arrive at new meaning,
uniting concepts together to ‘maximise’ Spinoza[95].
Likewise, a footnote by Robert Hurley on page 122 tells us of a
‘conceptual-affective continuum’, a distinction I will discuss later in terms
of the translation of the French word plan.
Given that Deleuze aims to draw out a model in Spinoza; Spinoza provides us this
‘kinetic determination’ or an ‘impulse’, as Deleuze writes:
The geometric
method ceases to be a method of intellectual exposition; it is no longer a
means of professional presentation but rather a method of invention. It becomes a method of vital and optical rectification.[96]
Deleuze wants Spinoza’s
philosophical system to be, given the title of his text, a practical
philosophy. One which works, rather than organises and forms meaning upon
bodies, formulating a subject. This is important to the term ‘plane of
immanence’, however, this expressionism is also at work with Deleuze’s method
of arranging the terms into an index. The intention is for us to arrive at new
meanings in Spinoza, where Deleuze expands and develops these terms. Hurley
introduces the text by suggesting that Deleuze gives a word to the wise, ‘one
doesn’t have to follow every proposition, make every connection – the intuitive
or affective reading may be more practical anyway’[97].
Rather than just exemplify ideas, Spinozism for Deleuze provides a certain way
of thinking, of forming ideas, extracting them away from a system of analogy or
eminence which forms a tension between the thought and its object[98].
I will use Deleuze’s framework to discuss the term ‘immanence’, which becomes
‘the plane of immanence’; the purpose of this will immobilise the notion of
‘eminence’, ‘transient causality’ and ‘transcendence’, of which I maintain is attributed
to Descartes’ system. To arrive at the term immanence, we must follow Deleuze’s
instruction as it appears:
Immanence. Cf.
Attribute, Cause, Eminence, Nature.[99]
We can see here that Deleuze is
referring us to other technical terms which correspond to ‘immanence’, this
systematic approach will provide us with the necessary information to bring
together a fully worked out system of immanence. For the purpose of the
assignment, I will not elaborate on the definition of Nature (or Natura naturatans/Natura naturata), as it does not contribute to the discussion as
such.
Once I have utilised Deleuze’s
index to work out what he proves in the term immanence, I will continue this
over to what Deleuze says in the later chapter Spinoza and Us, whereby he tells us of a the ‘laying out of a common plane of immanence on which all
bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated’[100].
To get an understanding of what Deleuze means by a ‘plane of immanence’, it is worth taking these necessary steps
through these terms which correspond to Spinoza’s metaphysical system; the term
immanence is an amalgam of the definitions Deleuze provides of attribute,
cause, eminence and nature. It is in this systematic order which Deleuze
manages to posit an account of immanence.
Definition of
Attribute:
Deleuze begins by confirming that
in Spinoza’s account there is an infinity of attributes (1def6). Yet we are to
only know two; thought and extension, insofar as we are mind and body[101].
Deleuze goes on to tell us that there is an infinity of attributes due to the
reason that ‘God has absolutely infinite power of existing, which cannot be
exhausted either by thought or by extension’[102].
Following this, Deleuze goes on to discuss how ‘the attributes are strictly the
same to the extent that they constitute the essence of substance and to the
extent that they are involved in, and contain, the essences of mode’[103].
Deleuze is referring to the relationship between substance and modes through
the attributes, or how the attributes are the middle term which bring together
substance and modes. What Deleuze is attempting to prove in Spinoza here is an
ontological unity which exists between God and finite modes. That things are
coextensive with God.
Before continuing this line of
discourse, it is worth distinguishing what Spinoza means by the term ‘mode’ as
it appears in the Ethics. Spinoza
tells us that ‘whatever is’, that is to say in existence, ‘is in God’[104]
1p15. This proposition follows with the proof that modes, which Spinoza
explains are ‘the affections of substance’[105]
(1def5) cannot be conceived without substance; ‘nothing exists except substance
and modes’, which follows Spinoza’s claim that all things are either ‘in
themselves or in something else’[106]
(ax1). Substance is dependent on no other thing; whereas modes are in another,
meaning that they depend on the being of another thing[107],
as Beth Lord writes on the subject, ‘in order for a mode to be, and in order for it to be conceived, something else must already
be and be conceived[108].
The term mode follows from
substance and attribute, and likewise Descartes thinks of something similar to
Spinoza[109].
Descartes writes in Principles (1.56)
that ‘mode’, is when a substance is ‘affected or modified’, for Descartes, mode
is an affection or a property of the thing, without which it would not be
conceivable[110].
Woolhouse uses the example that ‘the square shape of a piece of extended
substance would be one of its modes’, meaning that its squareness is a property
or affection of the thing, without which it would not be conceivable, and tells
us ‘not only because it can only be the shape of an extended thing, but also because it can only be the shape of that extended thing’[111].
Placing Descartes description of modes next to Spinoza’s is one method to gain
a clear understanding of what is meant by the term; in that both would agree
that by ‘affections of a substance’ they mean the changeable properties of a
substance[112].
What is at stake for Deleuze is the
notion of ‘finite modes’, which for Spinoza following 1p28, is ‘whatever is
determined to exist’. However, there are modes which are ‘eternal and
infinite’, of which ‘follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God’[113]
(1p21). This distinction continues into an albeit complex set of instructions,
whereby Spinoza writes that ‘if a mode is conceived to exist [..] to be
infinite’ then it must follow from ‘some attribute of God, either directly’[114]
as is 1p21, ‘or through the mediation of some modification which follows from
the absolute nature of the attribute’[115]
(1P23D). We begin to see a scale of modes which flow from God, from those which
are immediate and infinite and directly follow from an attribute of God. Georg
Hermann Schuller, who wrote on behalf of Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
asked for ‘examples’ of these ‘things which are produced immediately by God,
and those which are produced by the mediation of some infinite modification’[116].
Spinoza’s response to the former, that ‘infinite intellect’ follows from the
things produced immediately from God in terms of thought, whereas in the case
of extension he tells us of ‘motion and rest’[117]
(we will continue this line of discourse when addressing the ‘plane of
immanence’). However, finite modes, according to Woolhouse do not follow from
‘modes of the level above, but from modes of their own sort’[118].
Spinoza calls these finite modes ‘individual things’[119]
(1p28), and it is these ‘individual things’ which make up pieces of the corporeal
world, to which it is more clearly described as ‘finite modes’ of extended
substance[120].
Finite modes, according to Lord, are the ‘surface features’ of the infinite
continuum; finite modes of extension are the physical things which make up
reality. Finite modes of thought correspond to the mind and ideas[121].
What is more, if we think of this as a scale from the infinite mode to the
finite mode, we can think of that which follows from God’s divine attribute is
depth given to finite modes, rather than -as we will later see in the term
‘eminence’- there is not a hierarchical structure whereby anything preceding is
superior to its finite form.
Put simply, there is God (1p14),
which consists of infinite attributes (1def6). Infinite or finite modes are
conceived through an attribute (1def5). It appears that corporeal or material
things are finite modes of the attribute of extension, and likewise the
individual human mind are finite modes of the attribute of thought[122].
Returning then to Deleuze,
following the distinction he makes that ‘attributes are strictly the same to
the extent that they constitute the essence of substance and to the extent that
they are involved in, and contain, the essences of mode’[123],
he gives an example stating that ‘it is in the
same form that bodies imply extension and that extension is an attribute of
divine substance’[124].
As discussed previously when considering the idea of Spinoza identifying two
attributes, thought and extension; ‘man thinks’[125]
(2ax2) and ‘thought is an attribute of God’[126]
(2P1); man can be ‘affected in many ways’[127],
(2ax4) and ‘extension is an attribute of God’[128]
(2P2). Deleuze is referring to this distinction that there is a definite
equality in being between finite modes and God through the attribute of thought
and extension. It appears here that he is attempting to prove ‘attribute’ as a
middle term which brings together substance and mode, in doing so forming a
union of the two. Hence, I understand this as an ontological distinction,
whereby finite modes and divine substance are coextensive. Gillian Howie writes
that this ‘bringing together’ of what she calls ‘two extremes’, by which she is
referring to divine substance and finite modes, is not only a ‘syllogism’
whereby the unity of substance and mode is equal to being, but what Deleuze
means by ‘immanent causation’[129].
I will discuss immanent causation further when addressing the definition
Deleuze has of ‘cause’.
I believe that this initial crucial
definition which Deleuze sets out is to prove that God necessarily causes an
infinity of finite things to exist; that all things are in God and are likewise
dependent on Gods concurrence. Deleuze tells us that ‘immanence signifies […] the univocity
of the attributes: the same attributes are affirmed of the substance they
compose and of the modes they contain’[130].
We can find similarities in the
definition that Deleuze sets out in Expressionism,
in the chapter Immanence and the
Components of Expression, by writing that God ‘produces things in the very
forms that constitute his own essence’, and that it is the ‘attributes that
formally constitute God’s essence’ and that they ‘contain all formal essences
of modes’[131].
Deleuze is extending the same idea in Practical
Philosophy, as noted previously that Deleuze proves in Spinoza that the
attributes constitute the essence of substance are the same to the extent that
they contain the essences of modes. We can see in Expressionism this same argument where Deleuze tells us that modes
are ‘of divine being’, and that they ‘implicate the same attributes that
constitute the nature of this being’[132].
By this first definition, Deleuze
makes it clear that there is an immediate relationship between the things which
constitute the physical world and the metaphysical consideration of substance
or God.
Definition of Cause:
The definition of ‘attribute’ as
noted above is to prove the unity of self-caused substance and the finite
caused modes; for Deleuze, attribute is the middle term to demonstrate that
infinite finite things must immediately follow from infinite substance. The next
step will be to discuss how God is the ‘cause’ of himself amongst being the
‘cause’ of all things, that is to say that God is the immanent cause of things
rather than the transitive cause of all things[133].
Deleuze begins by citing 1def1
whereby Spinoza explains ‘by that which is self-caused I mean that whose
essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as
existing’[134],
what Spinoza means by self-caused, is that substance is eternal and exists
prior to its own existence[135].
Beth Lord writes quite succinctly that the definition of something which causes
itself to exist cannot be conceived as not existing for its essence involves
existence[136].
God or infinite substance never began or started, as that would mean something
else must have caused its existence, and as we know, substance for Spinoza does
not require the conception of another thing (1def3). Substance as self-caused
is an active power, one which is eternally bringing about its existence, as
Lord writes ‘the essence of “cause of itself” is to exist as the eternal
activity of “actualising” itself’[137].
Self-caused substance then must constantly accelerate the cause of its
actuality and likewise the effect of this causal power.
Deleuze tells us that Spinoza, in
this definition, ‘overturns’ the tradition of cause by ‘making cause of itself
the archetype of all causality’[138].
Whereas a traditional reading of cause leads to a distinct effect, or at least
suggest the production of effects. For Spinoza, there is an internal cause,
where cause is a continual power or action[139].
What Deleuze suggests in this overturning of the traditional employment of
causality is exactly what is explained in the sense of self-causality, God is
not merely the effect of a cause; it is not “as if by a cause” that God exists[140].
We can look back to Expressionism, as
again there are similarities which help elucidate this idea, Deleuze writes:
A cause is
immanent […] when its effect is “immanate” in the cause, rather than emanating
from it. What defines an immanent cause is that its effect is in it – in it, of
course, as in something else, but still being and remaining in it. The effect
remains in its cause no less than the cause remains in itself.[141]
This description and what Deleuze
begins with signifies that cause is immanent because God is in both cause and
in effect; there is a continual action where cause and effect are an
accelerating power which generates or sustains the existence of God. Deleuze
will go on to suggest in Practical
Philosophy, that there is a cause of a finite mode, the notion as we will
see leads to the consideration that God produces as he exists, or existence is
a continual flow of production. Deleuze writes that God ‘produces through the
same attributes that constitute his essence’, as we have seen in the previous
definition of attributes, and goes on to say that this implies that ‘God is the
cause of all things in the same sense
that he is the cause of himself’[142].
The idea that God is both the cause of all things as he is the cause of himself
follows what Spinoza writes at 1P25schol, that ‘God is said to be self-caused
he must also be said to be the cause of all things’[143],
which follows what Deleuze says that ‘he [God] produces in the same way that he
exists’[144].
Deleuze then takes this contention back round to the subject of immanence by
writing:
The cause is
essentially immanent; that is, it
remains in itself in order to produce (as against the transitive cause), just as the effect remains in itself (as against
the emanative cause)[145].
What we need to further make clear
is what Spinoza makes of immanence, which is found at 1P18, whereby Spinoza
tells us that ‘God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things’[146].
We already know that God is the cause of all things in the same way in which he
is self-caused (1p25schol). This also correlates to Spinoza’s proposition that
all things are conceived and are in God (1P16). 1P16 indicates that God is the
efficient cause of all things (1p16coll1) and that God is the cause of himself
(1p16coll2) and that God is absolutely the first cause (1p16coll3).
However, what is important to
distinguish is the difference between immanent cause and transitive cause which
can be found in the difference between Spinoza and Descartes. As stated
previously, Descartes’ substance creates further substances, which leads to the
idea that Descartes God causes or creates all things in a separate universe
from himself[147].
That is, Descartes use of substance creates things externally, whereas we can
see for Spinoza that substance is self-caused and all things are in and are
conceived only through God. Where Descartes allows for substance which depends
on Gods concurrence, Spinoza tells us that ‘there can be no substance external
to God’[148]
(1P14). God’s causality or production of modes is equal to the actualisation of
the essence of his own existence, and that God’s causality remains within God.
Lord gives a perfect example of these fundamental differences between immanent
cause and emanative cause, by suggesting:
[for Spinoza]
God’s causality of the modes is not like an artist’s creation of sculptures. A
better analogy is the way in which you cause your facial expressions.[149]
For Descartes, God is the artist
creating sculptures which are external to his own existence; the sculpture
being the universe and all things. Whereas for Spinoza, following Lord’s
example, God is the body which causes the facial expression and therefore the
cause and effect is in God, as the facial expression is the affection of that
particular body. The idea here, which Deleuze sets to prove is that immanent
causality follows 1Def1, self-causality or God as ‘cause of itself’. Deleuze
sets out to prove in Spinoza that substance causes itself, and places emphasis
on the notion that self-causality includes both the cause and the effect of
itself; that the effects of substance’s causality remains in itself. As Lord
writes, ‘as cause of itself […] God is the power of self-actualisation –
substance […]; as effect of itself, God is that which is actualised – the
modes’[150].
The definition Deleuze provides,
between attributes and cause, follows that there is a unity of finite modes and
divine substance which is unified through the attribute which constitutes the
essence. Furthermore, God is self-caused and causes all things immanently
rather than eminently. This definition is important when considering the implications
of immanence and against Cartesianism. That immanence immobilises the Cartesian
subject of God as a creator superior to the modes, whereas immanence provides a
univocity and coexistence between God and finite modes.
Definition of Eminence:
In the previous definition of
‘cause’, I touched on the notion of eminent cause which perhaps gives further
indication to what Deleuze intends to define in this section. However, I will
also look at Expressionism as there
is an interesting and relevant definition which correlates to what Deleuze is
wanting to prove in the definition of eminence. Firstly, I will explain what
Deleuze is telling us in Practical
Philosophy before placing both definitions together to perhaps elucidate
this term.
Deleuze writes that ‘eminence’ is
‘wrong in claiming to see something common between God and created beings’
(finite modes) ‘where there is nothing in common (confusion of essences) and in
denying the common forms where they do exist (illusion of transcendent forms);
they fracture Being and confuse the essences at the same time’[151].
Deleuze has already proven in
Spinoza a unification of God and created beings in the attributes, and
reiterates this claim in telling us that the attributes ‘exist in the same form
in God, of whose existence they constitute the essence, and in the modes which
involve them in their essence’[152].
Deleuze calls this unity or commonality of God and the modes ‘univocity’; and
tells us that this ‘univocity of the attributes’ preserves ‘the absolute unity
of Being’[153].
So, we have seen how Deleuze continues to place emphasis on the immanence found
in Spinoza, but we need to begin to recognise why Deleuze is wanting to
collapse the distinction of eminence.
It is in Expressionism where Deleuze gives a detailed description of
eminence, of which I maintain furthers the initial point in Practical Philosophy where Deleuze tells
us that eminence is incorrect as it claims ‘to see something common between God
and created beings’[154].
In the chapter Spinoza Against Descartes of
Expressionism, Deleuze explains that
the term eminence means that God ‘contains all reality, but eminently, in a
form other than that of the things he creates’[155].
What is meant, is that Descartes view of God in relation to the corporeal world
or universe, is substantially different from the metaphysical reality where God
exists; the two exist in separate entities. If we look to Descartes’ Replies, he tells us that the idea of
substance as the ‘thing in which whatever we perceive […] exists, either
formally or eminently’[156].
If we think back to the definition Beth Lord made in terms of immanent cause
and eminent cause, we can begin to think of God as the sculptor in Descartes’
proposition; that the artist exists separate to the sculpture, residing in two
different entities. Eminent cause implies that the cause is beyond the effect.
In the succeeding chapter of Expressionism, Immanence and the Components of Expression, Deleuze continues to
action the term eminence. The first task Deleuze takes is to explain the common
characteristic, which is basically the idea that for both Spinoza and
Descartes, substance is dependent on no other thing (1.51), (1Def3) and both
are productive (1.51) (1Def5, ax1, 1P24, 1P25)[157].
For Descartes, created substance is dependent on God’s concurrence; for Spinoza,
there are finite modes which depend on God’s continual power (1P23). The second
task that Deleuze has is to explain how although both theories of substance are
productive, it is in the way in which the two causes produce things which
reveals their fundamental differences[158].
Deleuze goes on to write that an emanative cause, whilst remaining in itself; ‘the effect it produces is not in it, and
does not remain in it’[159];
this is fundamentally different to Spinoza following what was earlier
discussed, whereby cause and effect remain in God. Deleuze recognises this in Expressionism as discussed earlier in
the consideration of cause, by writing that ‘a cause is immanent […] when its
effect is “immanate” in the cause, rather than emanating from it’[160],
which literally means that the effect remains in the cause and the cause
remains in itself; rather than the effect being external to the cause (think
again of the example of the artist and the sculpture). For Deleuze, the
emanative cause is a hierarchical structure, whereby each form is followed by
another which is superior to it, writing:
Emanation thus
serves as the principle of a universe rendered hierarchical: the difference of
beings is in general conceived as a hierarchical difference; each term is as it
were the image of the superior term that precedes it, and is defined by the
degree of distance that separates it from the first cause or first principle.[161]
Taking the position that emanation
is a hierarchical structure or theory, we can position immanence against emanation
as Deleuze intends; to collapse the hierarchical distinction which eminence
indirectly constructs. Firstly, as we have seen, attributes constitute the
essence of substance inasmuch as they are involved in, and contain, the
essences of mode[162].
Secondly, an effect is in the cause and the cause is in itself, which
corresponds to immanent cause; rather than effect being external to the cause
(eminently)[163].
God as immanent substance, as Deleuze writes, is ‘a principle’ of the ‘equality
of being’, and that the ‘cause appears as everywhere equally’, which means that
‘beings are not defined by their rank in a hierarchy […] but each depends directly
on God, participating in the equality of being’[164].
So, to bring this back to Practical Philosophy, when Deleuze tells
us that eminence is wrong because it implies commonality between God and
created beings, and that eminence fractures being, we can begin to see that it
is in virtue of the hierarchical structure which reduces created beings, rather
than indicate the participation of God in the equality of being. Deleuze
recognises that eminence is not formulated by Descartes but is a result of
Scholasticism and Thomism, whereby it is embedded[165].
Deleuze tells us that eminence has an essential presence in Descartes, and can
be found within his theories of Being, God and of creatures[166].
Eminence results in a negative theology[167],
one which Deleuze revives in Spinoza, extending it towards a positive ontology.
“Plane of Immanence”, “Plan of Transcendence”, BwO:
Deleuze and Guattari consistently draw parallels between the BwO and Spinozist immanence, and we find ourselves back at Spinoza’s Ethics quite quickly when taking this into consideration. I will be discussing here the final chapter of Practical Philosophy, titled Spinoza and Us. I will begin by outlining what Deleuze means by the ‘plane of immanence’ in Practical Philosophy, as this term is carried over to A Thousand Plateaus. Given some technical changes in terminology, Deleuze and Guattari ask whether the plane of consistency constitutes the BwO, or does the BwO compose the plane, or better still; is the BwO and the plane the ‘same thing’?[168] Between Deleuze’s early encounter with Spinoza and what is said on the BwO in A Thousand Plateaus, there are certainly conceptual parallels to be drawn together. My argument relies on these conceptual equivalents, allowing me to conclude that Spinozism is the model of thought which underlies the BwO; that this course of philosophy constitutes a danger, or a revolutionary threat of destabilisation, one which transmits a dynamic impulse[169].
Deleuze in the chapter Spinoza and Us, sets out a claim that
immanence is not only the affirmation of a single substance, that all beings or
bodies are modal expressions of this single substance, but rather a ‘laying out
of a common plane of immanence on
which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated’. We can
understand this plane by thinking back to Spinoza, that all things (modes)
exist on the same plane (substance). Deleuze reminds us here of the univocity
of being that he has proven in Spinoza’s proposition of immanence[170].
The title of the chapter Spinoza and Us,
literally means ‘us’, all beings, in the middle of Spinoza. This idea then
leads Deleuze to write that ‘to be in the middle of Spinoza is to be on this
modal plane, or rather to install oneself on this plane – which implies a mode
of living, a way of life’[171]
To immerse yourself into Spinoza’s philosophy, as Deleuze requests, is to
conceive of reality; it is an action of philosophy, or an ethos[172].
Deleuze is putting to work the very
practicality of the conceptual framework which is involved with the plane of
immanence[173].
One whereby, to be a Spinozist is to live in this plane, or conceptual web that
Deleuze considers of Spinoza’s philosophical system. Spinozism is an experience
which carries life and thought ineluctably beyond the traditional limits of
philosophy[174].
The term ‘plane’ can be divided
from the term ‘plan’. Robert Hurley’s translation footnote on page 122
indicates that the French word ‘plan’ covers all the meanings of the English
“plan” and “plane”. Hurley tells us that the translation of ‘plan
d’immanence ou de consistence’[175]
is translated to ‘plane’ where the meaning is a ‘conceptual-affective
continuum’. Hurley talks of translating ‘plan de transcendence ou
d’orginisation’ into ‘plan’, which means a map or design. Deleuze tells us that
on the contrary to the plane of immanence is the ‘plan of organisation or
development’, which refers to ‘transcendence'; a design in the mind of God, or
‘society’s organisation of power’[176].
The distinction of the plan of transcendence is a type of structural or
striated design, one which is eminently formed. Eminently, as transcendence is
the ‘beyond’ which separates the metaphysical substance from the modes. That
is, the power of God is independent of that which he brings into being. We
should not think insofar that the ‘plane of immanence’ is simply against the
‘plan of transcendence’, but that that immanence should not hand itself over to
transcendence. Immanence by its very nature can only include immanence, as
ontologically anterior to transcendence[177].
So, what we have at work is a plane of immanence which grounds reality or
experience, and second a plane of transcendence which function is to organise
and socialise the first[178].
The plane of transcendence, a humanist tradition, requires the organisation of
natural affects by a power which is beyond, or transcends, the natural
condition[179].
What is important to establish is that the plane of immanence, or even for that
matter the BwO, is not one condition which replaces the other; rather, it seeks
change from within[180].
The plane of immanence or
consistency is a ‘section, intersection, a diagram’[181].
That all things are situated on a plane whereby the subject is not defined by
form or organisation but defined by its ‘affective capacity, with a maximum
threshold and minimum threshold’[182].
Returning now to what I discussed in terms of the mediate infinite mode of the attribute of extension when defining
the term mode, we begin to see what Deleuze means by this affective capacity. What
is at stake here is an infinite continuum of physicality, one whereby all
bodies are one continuous physical reality[183].
Bodies are not differentiated by their form, as Deleuze points out, so how are
they distinguished for Spinoza? He tells us that all bodies are distinguished
from one another in respect of motion and rest (2P13ax1), quickness and
slowness (2P13ax2) (2P13 Lem1). Spinoza writes, following this idea of the
physical continuum:
Each body must
have been determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely,
another body, which is also in motion or at rest. But this body again – by the
same reasoning – could not have been in motion or at rest unless it had been
determined to motion or rest by another body, and this body again – by the same
reasoning – by another body, and so on, ad infinitum[184].
(2P13proof).
Hence, we begin to see how a body
is not defined by its form, in this idea of the continuum we begin to see a
single material for all bodies. All of which are defined by motion and rest, or
a threshold of accelerating and decelerating velocities. A person riding a
horse, for example, is a unified whole for Spinoza. He gives a definition that
a number of bodies of a certain magnitude form close contact with one another,
that is, if they are moving at the same rates of speed, it is said that they
are to be ‘united with one another and all together to form one body or
individual thing’[185]
(2P13 def). So, there would be no way to tell apart the horse and the person in
this metaphysical consideration. Spinoza has collapsed this very distinction
that a thing, a mode, is defined by its form or organisation. The plan of
transcendence however, is likened to the plane of organisation and development.
In a similar remark to what Deleuze has told us in his definition of eminence,
the plan of transcendence or organisation is one which forms and organises from
an external position. It is not coextensive with what it creates, Deleuze
writes:
Whatever one may
say, then, it will always be a plan of transcendence that directs forms as well
as subjects, and that stays hidden, that is never given, that can only be
divined, induced, inferred from what it gives. It always has an additional
dimension; it always implies a dimension supplementary to the dimensions of the
given.[186]
The subject of transcendence for
Deleuze echoes what we discussed regarding Descartes’ created substances, that
God appears in a different or separate dimension to the modes. The threat that
this imposes on being, is that its organisation, its form and analysis is
dictated by a form which is not present nor is it equal to the beings it
organises.
Moving on to A Thousand Plateaus and the subject of BwO, Deleuze and Guattari
draw on similarities to what Deleuze says of the plane of immanence. The
chapter How do
you make Yourself a Body Without Organs, examines the ways in which
bodies interact in the world. Deleuze and Guattari seek to question the ways in
which our desires are shaped by our experience, whether through sadomasochism
(pleasure/pain) or knowledge, for example. The question of the BwO is, can we
free ourselves of the organising principles, can we free ourselves of the
organs? And if so, does this process at its limit lead us towards the philosophy
of immanence?
A technical development which
occurs is the difference between the initial term ‘immanence’ and
‘consistency’, although Deleuze and Guattari refer to the BwO as immanent
substance, they also refer to it as being the ‘plane of consistency’.
Consistency for Deleuze and Guattari ‘concretely ties together heterogenous,
disparate elements as such’[187].
What they mean by this is that things are connected without having any sort of
element in common. An example Deleuze and Guattari use in A Thousand Plateaus is the orchid and the wasp; the orchid feeding
the wasp, the wasp fertilising the orchid. In of themselves they are two beings
with absolutely nothing to do with each other, and yet one cannot survive
without the other. In Practical
Philosophy, Deleuze writes that Spinozists do not define a thing by its
forms, nor its organs and its functions[188].
The plane of consistency is just that, thinking of the example of the wasp and
the orchid it is clear to see the relation of bodies through how they are
affected, or the affects which they are capable of[189],
rather than their difference through their constituent parts or functions. Likewise,
the BwO is defined by its thresholds, vectors, gradients, whereby in its purest
form the organs function as pure intensities[190].
Deleuze’s terms are congruent with Spinoza’s terms of what differentiates
bodies from one another, what causes bodies to interact and how bodies are
affected; movements and rests, slowness and speeds. Without resorting to
speculation, it is clear that the BwO diverges from the plane of immanence, the
conceptual framework is one which is developed from Deleuze’s own encounter
with Spinoza. The term BwO itself comes from French playwright Antonin Artaud’s
1947 radio performance To Have Done with
the Judgement of God, where Artaud says:
God,
And with god
His organs.
For you can tie
me up if you wish,
But there is
nothing more useless than an organ.
When you will
have made him a body without organs,
Then you will
have delivered him from all his automatic reactions
And restored him
to his true freedom[191].
Deleuze and Guattari are not unique
in their reference to Artaud; Derrida and Foucault follow closely in their
appreciation[192].
Artaud is a figure who stands at the intersection between sense and nonsense,
art and nonart, thesis and antithesis, philosophy and nonphilosophy[193];
standing as a figure who collapses sense.
Deleuze and Guattari borrow the
term BwO from Artaud. Perhaps their appreciation of Artaud is due to the idea
that in Artaud’s work, there is a direct expression of his mental illness which
is manifested through a violent language. That there is a modality of schizophrenia,
whereby Artaud’s suffering is communicable. Through art and literature, Artaud
manages to survive under the harsh circumstances of mental illness,
institutionalisation and addiction; that his works are a catharsis for enduring
the suffering[194].
Deleuze and Guattari speak through Artaud; the benefit of this allows them to
break through the impasse that psychoanalysis holds over its subjects.
Between Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand
Plateaus, we manage to generate an idea of what the BwO is. A description
of the BwO is difficult to form given its very nature. Since introduced as a
‘collapse of the surface’[195]
in the Logic of Sense, through to Anti-Oedipus where it is in conjuncture
with the term ‘quasi-cause’ and its use in A
Thousand Plateaus, the term evolves to the point it is declared a
‘nonconcept’[196].
To give a succinct definition may lead towards problems, Anti-Oedipus gives bold statements which make the task of defining
BwO almost impossible, stating that the BwO ‘represents nothing, but it produces.
It means nothing, but it works’[197].
What Deleuze wants to avoid is
providing an analysis of the plane of immanence; Deleuze and Guattari hold the
same attitude towards the BwO. To give a formal analysis would be to subscribe
to this notion of organisation, forming a subject, all together from a stance
above what it is that is being described. In Practical Philosophy, Deleuze manages to not define ‘immanence’ in
a formal sense, but as we have seen, provides us with a collection of fragments
which provide an action or an impulse in its heuristic method. There is a sense
that Deleuze and Guattari further this proposition by inviting us to read back
into Spinoza the condition of the BwO, again, in order to not guide us through
a linear series of definitions, one has to place themselves in the middle of
the plane. Like Spinoza, instead of asking “what a body is”, it is better to
ask, “what can a body do” (3P2 schol). Likewise, as with the BwO, rather than
ask “what is the BwO”, they ask “how can you make yourself a body without
organs”. This proves difficult to then discuss the BwO as a formal system, but
it is fair to deduce from Deleuze’s early work that the mechanics of the BwO
lies in the heart of a Spinozian ethos.
The BwO relies on a reading of
Spinoza; the Ethics for Deleuze and
Guattari is the book of the BwO[198].
Likewise, they tell us that the BwO is immanence, that it is ‘immanent limit’[199].
Substance in both Descartes and Spinoza is limit, as it depends on no other
thing. Nothing came before substance as this would contradict this statement, therefore
substance is limit. The BwO is likewise limit, Deleuze and Guattari are
establishing BwO as substance, as a metaphysic.
Deleuze and Guattari consider
Artaud’s claim that ‘the body is never an organism/organisms are the enemy of
the body’[200].
It is not the BwO because its body is inimical to organs, but inimical to
‘organism’ and ‘organisation’[201].
What is meant here is that the organs are the instruments of manipulation;
Artaud claims that to liberate oneself from the judgement of God you should do
away with the organs. It is not, for Deleuze and Guattari at least, the organs
which are the enemy, but the thing which structures the body into a
theological, social or psychoanalytical system[202].
Keeping to the line of enquiry which brings together the plane of immanence and
the BwO, there is a distinction that can be drawn with their departure from
eminent philosophy; one whereby there appears to be a thing or being which is
constructing and organising others in a reality of authority separate and
superior, as they write in Anti-Oedipus:
Beneath its
organs it senses there are larvae and loathsome worms, and a God at work
messing it all up or strangling it by organizing it.[203]
Given Deleuze’s own description of
eminence, it is clear to see the disdain of power over the individual mode
which exists transcendentally. Although it is not a simple case of transposing
the term ‘mode’ over the term ‘organs’ (considering that in A Thousand Plateaus, the modes
correspond to intensities), we must think of this in terms of the univocity of
being. Keeping in mind the relation the BwO has to the plane of immanence, then
what Deleuze and Guattari have in mind here is very much the fractured nature
of transcendence. If we think back to what Deleuze described in terms of
eminence, then we begin to see what Deleuze and Guattari mean when the BwO is
being strangulated by the judgement of God. In terms of Descartes’ God
organising and fixing together the modes from a separate entity, or likewise
Sigmund Freud (in terms of psychoanalysis for example) analysing his subjects
from a distance; in a domain of rationality and sense. There becomes a
difference between beings, a hierarchical difference. The BwO, read through
this Spinozian lens, is not an apparatus which organises the body or forms a
concept of the body. It seeks not to render bodies into subjects; it is not the
destruction of the body or the denaturalisation of the body, but the
realisation of a body that is not subjected to a form of transcendental
organisation. An organisation which only serves to define the body in terms of
functions, one which manipulates the organs to make it an organism[204].
Given that I have endeavoured to
show how the plane of immanence and the BwO are connected; or at least through
Deleuze and Guattari’s instruction followed their trajectory, is it important
to consider why Deleuze and Guattari establish the BwO as Spinozist. Deleuze
and Guattari consider psychoanalytic discourse to be a form of thought which
organises sociability, it forms binary oppositions of its subjects;
nature/civilisation, woman/man, phallic/castrated, active/passive, subject of
desire/object of desire[205].
Deleuze and Guattari say that the BwO is what remains when you take everything
away[206].
Given that their aim is to free subjects from the grasp of a structure, they
must break down the parts and see what lies beneath it, they write ‘what you
take away is precisely the […] signifiances and subjectifications’[207].
The notion of power over the BwO imposes on it forms, functions, hierarchised
organisations, and organised transcendences according to Deleuze and Guattari[208].
These organisations, functions, bonds are a result of the God strangulating the
plane, of overcrowding it with signs and meaning, protecting the sovereignty of
the subject and its identity. Artaud found himself stripped of all
signification, of all meaning, ‘finding himself with no shape or form whatsoever,
right there where he was at that moment’[209].
It is the BwO that the organs enter into the relations of composition called
the organism. Deleuze and Guattari write that the BwO howls: “They’ve made me
an organism! They’ve wrongfully folded me! They’ve stolen my body!” The
judgement of God uproots it from immanence and makes it an organism, a subject[210].
The BwO in its purest form, is a plane of immanence or consistency whereby a
field of new connections, of creative becomings, behaviours and ontological
differences are formulated. Beneath the surface of all concepts, all
developments and forms is the substance or plane, whereby these ideas,
subjects, forms are dispersed in the first place, as a kind of preconceptual
condition[211].
Spinoza against Descartes is a
representation of the vehemence that Deleuze maximises in Spinoza. In the BwO,
they melt Spinozism into psychoanalytic discourse. The BwO is immanent, which
does away from the judgement of God, from transcendental organisation. They
seek in Spinoza a revolutionary impulse, one which swerves away from
Cartesianism; a philosophy which posits an equality of all beings and all
forms. Deleuzean-Spinozian immanence is a theory of unitary being[212],
an equal and univocal Being in full positivity. In Artaud, they bring to this
distinction a schizophrenzing of the existing power structure inherent to
psychoanalytic discourse. In the sense of the BwO as a bricolage of these two
conditions, Deleuze and Guattari seek a change which ruptures from within,
rather than replacing one structure with another.
What Deleuze philosophy achieves is
a post-humanistic ethical probity; it provides a robust alternative through an
ethological view of the subject based on affects. The same is true of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus if we follow the line of discourse I have
striven to emphasise. Anticartesianism for Deleuze which he reads in Spinoza,
is not a retreat from Descartes’ system but an advancement. Spinoza, Deleuze
tells us, uses Descartes’ metaphysical system to advance beyond all its inadequacies[213].
What is important in this connection between the BwO and the plane of
immanence, is that Deleuze and Guattari likewise burrow themselves in
structuralist discourse, they are parasitic to psychoanalysis. Artaud’s voice
is etched into Deleuze and Guattari’s work which dramatizes a paradigm shift in
their thinking; and that the plane of immanence or the BwO can be influenced by
a subject’s actions[214].
Artaud gives Deleuze and Guattari a means to break through the impasse that
psychoanalytic discourse holds over the subject through its organising power.
In conclusion, I have found in an
early account of Deleuze an alternative reading of the BwO, which if we follow
this trajectory makes sense of the BwO in terms of being ‘immanent substance’.
The instance I have elaborated on Anticartesianism provides the context for
Deleuze’s own action of philosophy, one which forms a critique of the dominant
discourses which organise subjects and form representations. The BwO and the
plane of immanence, I have strived to show, are connected. It is as if the BwO
is the face of a watch, and the plane of immanence, with all its Spinozian
counterparts, are the mechanics which drive the BwO into action.
If we are to consider the BwO as
immanent substance, then, as I have shown, it is not a simple procedure of
transposing Spinoza’s terms over Deleuze and Guattari’s, but to bring
philosophy into action. That to understand the BwO as a Spinozist apparatus,
there needs to be an understanding of Deleuze’s encounter, one which provides
an expressive impulse against linear sense. Spinozism works, it functions; in
reading into the BwO this way then it becomes clear why Deleuze and Guattari do
not do themselves a disservice to align these readings.
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*
[1] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 1st ed. New York: Viking Press p 327
[2] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A Thousand
Plateaus. London: Bloomsbury Academic p 178
[3] Howie,
G. (2002). Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of
Expressionism. 1st ed. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan p 13
[4]. Beistegui,
M. (2010). Immanence - Deleuze and
Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press p 117
[5]
ibid p 116
[6] Patton,
P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze:
A Critical Reader. 1st ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd p 140
[7] Deleuze,
G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza. 1st ed. New York: Zone Books p 167
[8] Cottingham,
J. (2006). The Cambridge companion to
Descartes. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p 412-3
[9] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. 1st ed.
London: Routledge. p 15
[10] Descartes,
R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press p. 210
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Ibid.
[13] Descartes,
R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press p 157
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Ibid.
[16] Robinson,
T. (2017). 17th Century Theories of
Substance | Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. [online] Iep.utm.edu.
Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/substanc/ [Accessed 10 Jul. 2017].
[17]
Ibid.
[18] Descartes,
R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1. p 210
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
Ibid.
[23] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. P 16
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Ibid.
[26] Descartes,
R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1. p 210
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Shein, N. (2017). Spinoza's Theory of Attributes.
[online]
[29] Descartes,
R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1. p 210
[30]
Ibid. p 211
[31] Descartes,
R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2. p 156
[32] Descartes,
R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1. p 215
[33] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 19
[34] Descartes,
R., Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. and Murdoch, D. (1985). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume 1 p 339
[35]
ibid p 325
[36] Cottingham,
J. (2006). The Cambridge companion to
Descartes p 238
[37]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics; Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. 2nd ed.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc p 31
[38]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 31
[39] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 32
[40]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 31
[41]
Dutton, B. (2017). Spinoza, Benedict De
| Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. [online] Iep.utm.edu. Available at:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/spinoza/ [Accessed 10 Jul. 2017]
[42]
Ibid.
[43] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 32.
[44]
Ibid.
[45] Koistinen,
O., Viljanen, V. and Schmidt, A. (2009). The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. p 61
[46] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 32
[47]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 36
[48]
ibid. p 81
[49] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 33
[50]
Ibid.
[51] Koistinen,
O., Viljanen, V. and Schmidt, A. (2009). The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics p 81
[52] Shein,
N. (2017). Spinoza's Theory of Attributes.
[online] Plato.stanford.edu. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-attributes/
[Accessed 14 Jul. 2017].
[53]
Ibid.
[54]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 33
[55] Lord,
B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. 1st ed.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p 28
[56]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 31
[57] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 34
[58]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 64
[59]
Ibid.
[60]
Ibid p 31
[61] Woolhouse,
R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz;
The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 34
[62]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 39
[63]
Ibid. p 31
[64] Koistinen,
O., Viljanen, V. and Schmidt, A. (2009). The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics p 81
[65]
Ibid.
[66]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 37
[67]
Ibid p 32
[68]
Ibid p 33
[69]
Dutton, B. (2017). Spinoza, Benedict De
| Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. [online]
[70]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 33
[71]
Dutton, B. (2017). Spinoza, Benedict De
| Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. [online].
[72]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 33
[73] Koistinen,
O., Viljanen, V. and Schmidt, A. (2009). The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics p 81
[74]
Ibid. p 82
[75]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 31
[76] Koistinen,
O., Viljanen, V. and Schmidt, A. (2009). The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics p 84
[77]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 39
[78] Deleuze,
G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy. San Francisco: City Lights Books p 19
[79]
ibid p 11
[80]
Nietzsche, F., Kaufmann, W. and Hollingdale, R. (1989). On the Genealogy of Morals & Ecce Homo. 1st ed. New York:
Vintage p 218
[81] Deleuze,
G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 130.
[82]
ibid p 8
[83] Cottingham,
J. (2006). The Cambridge companion to
Descartes p 413
[84]
Deleuze, G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza p 161
[85] Lord,
B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. 1st ed.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p 17
[86]
Ibid.
[87]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. 2nd ed.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. p 241-2
[88]
Koistinen, O., Viljanen, V. and Schmidt, A. (2009). The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press p 52
[89]
ibid p 53
[90] Deleuze,
G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza p 133
[91]
Koistinen, O., Viljanen, V. and Schmidt, A. (2009). The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. p 42
[92] Deleuze,
G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza: Practical
Philosophy p 28-9
[93]
ibid p 29
[94] Patton,
P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze:
A Critical Reader p 143
[95] Deleuze,
G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p iii
[96]
ibid p 13
[97]
ibid p iii
[98] Patton,
P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze:
A Critical Reader p 146
[99] Deleuze,
G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 76
[100]
Ibid. p 122
[101]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 52
[102]
Ibid.
[103]
Ibid.
[104]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 40
[105]
Ibid p 31
[106]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 32
[107]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p
20
[108]
Ibid.
[109]
Woolhouse, R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz; The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 50
[110]
Descartes, R. and Cottingham, J. (1985). The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1. p 210
[111]
Woolhouse, R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz; The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 50
[112]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p
20
[113]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 47
[114]
ibid
[115]
Ibid p 48
[116]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p
39
[117]
Ibid.
[118]
Woolhouse, R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz; The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 50
[119]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 50
[120]
Woolhouse, R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz; The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 36
[121]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p
41
[122]
Woolhouse, R. (1993). Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz; The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics. p 51
[123]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 52
[124]
Ibid. p 52
[125]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 64
[126]
ibid
[127]
ibid
[128]
ibid
[129]
Howie, G. (2002). Deleuze and Spinoza:
Aura of Expressionism. p 48
[130]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 52
[131]
Deleuze, G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza. New York: Zone Books. p 180
[132]
Ibid.
[133]
Ibid.
[134]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 31
[135]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p
19
[136]
Ibid.
[137]
Ibid. p 20
[138]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 53
[139]
Howie, G. (2002). Deleuze and Spinoza:
Aura of Expressionism. p 67
[140]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 53
[141]
Deleuze, G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza p 172
[142]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 54
[143]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 49
[144]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 54
[145]
ibid
[146]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 46
[147]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p
37
[148]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 39
[149]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p
37
[150]
ibid p 87
[151]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 64
[152]
ibid p 63
[153]
Ibid p 64
[154]
ibid p 64
[155]
Deleuze, G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza p 163
[156]
Descartes, R. and Cottingham, J. (1985).
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2. p 114
[157]
Deleuze, G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza p 171
[158]
Ibid
[159]
Ibid
[160]
Ibid p 172
[161]
Ibid p 173
[162]
ibid p 52
[163]
ibid p 172
[164]
Ibid p 173
[165]
ibid p 163
[166]
ibid p 163
[167]
ibid p 165
[168]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A
Thousand Plateaus p 590
[169]
Patton, P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze: A Critical Reader p 148
[170]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 122
[171]
ibid
[172]
Patton, P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze: A Critical Reader p 147
[173]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 122.
[174]
Patton, P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze: A Critical Reader p 147
[175]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 122.
[176]
Ibid. p 128
[177]
Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding Modernism. 1st ed. New York:
Bloomsbury p 27
[178]
Patton, P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze: A Critical Reader p 165
[179]
ibid p 164
[180]
Buchanan, I. (2008). Deleuze and
Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus". London: Continuum p 10
[181]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 122
[182]
Ibid
[183]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics p
61
[184]
Spinoza, B., Shirley, S. and Feldman, S. (1992). The Ethics p 73
[185]
Ibid p 74
[186]
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics p
61
[187]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A
Thousand Plateaus p 589
[188]
Deleuze, G. and Hurley, R. (2007). Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy p 127
[189]
ibid p 125
[190]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A
Thousand Plateaus p 178
[191]
Artaud, A., Sontag, S. and Weaver, H. (1988). Antonin Artaud, Selected Writings. 1st ed. California: University
of California Press p 571
[192]
Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding Modernism p 81
[193]
ibid p 198
[194]
ibid
[195]
Deleuze, G. and Lester, M. (1990). The
Logic of sense. New York: Columbia University Press p 87
[196]
Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding Modernism p 203
[197]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia p 109
[198]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A
Thousand Plateaus p 178
[199]
ibid p 179
[200]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia p 9
[201]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A Thousand
Plateaus p 184
[202]
Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding Modernism p 81
[203]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia p 9
[204]
Patton, P., Macherey, P. and Gatens, M. (1996). Deleuze: A Critical Reader p 174
[205]
ibid p 176
[206]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A
Thousand Plateaus p 176
[207]
ibid
[208]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A
Thousand Plateaus p 184
[209]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia p 8
[210]
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A
Thousand Plateaus p 185
[211]
Howie, G. (2002). Deleuze and Spinoza:
Aura of Expressionism p 84
[212]
Deleuze, G. and Joughin, M. (2013). Expressionism
in Philosophy: Spinoza p 167
[213]
ibid p 325
[214]
Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding Modernism p 206
