Gilles Deleuze in the second chapter of Difference and Repetition (1962) implies a series of statements which leads to the claim of habit being the first synthesis of time. In doing so brings to light two seminal texts by Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Time and Free Will (1889) and his later text Matter and Memory (1896). Between these two texts is an important distinction that leads us to Deleuze’s consideration of habit being the 'foundation of time'. In this paper, I aim to dig beneath the surface of this claim made by Deleuze, which will lead us to rethink the philosophical account of habit and to focus our attention towards a consideration of time. I will impose a possible philosophical link with Bergson’s precursor Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900). This link has been made by Arthur Lovejoy (1873 -1962) who brought both Ravaisson and Bergson together in his essay Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson (1913) to address the thought of 'duration' (durée).
In a footnote to the chapter Repetition for Itself in his text Difference and Repetition, Deleuze leads us to two works by Bergson:
The Bergson text [in regards to Deleuze’s claim on duration and quantifiable external-impressions]is in Time and Free-will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness […] there, Bergson clearly distinguishes the two aspects: fusion or contraction in the mind, and deployment in space. Contraction as the essence of duration, and as operating on elementary material agitations in order to constitute the perceived quality, is even more precisely dealt with in Matter and Memory
This will be the first position I will undertake to acknowledge Deleuze’s claim of habit as the foundation of time. I will begin with an outline of Bergson’s text Time and Free Will which gives us an initial account of duration. In the second chapter of the thesis, Bergson responds to a confusion between space and time in the Kantian system. His work seems to attempt to unmix and make clear distinctions of both space and time. Bergson appears to rethink the ordinary conception of time into what he will call duration, which I believe to be the unity of past and present with the anticipation of future. In order for us to think of this question of duration, Bergson maintains that we should isolate consciousness from space or externality. Bergson gives a few examples to support a claim of the spatialization of time. One of the allegorical examples is in the consideration of counting a flock of sheep in a field. Each sheep is similar, or identical, so in no sense is there any qualitative change in enumerating them. The only method that the sheep can be counted is spatially, that is they are counted in the stead of their spatiality. Therefore, in Bergson’s account, quantitative multiplicities are 'homogenous' and 'spatial'. What Bergson demands is a thinking of time that is nonquantifiable and in succession rather than in simultaneity, one of which is a unification of past, present with the anticipation of the future.
In Time and Free Will alone, I maintain that there is not a positive account of duration, however Bergson in Matter and Memory appears to satisfy the initial claim of duration with the implication of what he will call 'habit memory'. This will confirm Deleuze’s suggestion that the qualitative distinction is more precisely dealt with in Matter and Memory. What appears in Matter and Memory is of great importance to this thesis, as it invokes an account of habit. Bergson defines habit as being like a motor memory, which is considered next to episodic memory. What I will go to explain is how Bergson reveals that habit as a form of memory acts out past impressions in the present, in anticipation of the future. What I will go on to argue from the position that Bergson undertakes, is a remarkably similar position to Ravaisson’s Of Habit (1838). I will claim that Ravaisson distinguishes between time and space by eliciting the conception of the 'organic' and the 'inorganic'. Ravaisson opens with the remark that 'habit is change', and that all 'change is realised in time'. Whereas the inorganic, which we will see as being externality or space, in Ravaisson’s claim is 'stability' and 'permanence'. These claims become remarkably familiar when addressing Bergson’s texts, and will allow us to expose the deeper philosophical foundations of Deleuze’s claim. To put it in a more linear tense, Ravaisson conceives this notion of space and time in regards to a metaphysical account of habit, Bergson develops this account, Deleuze brings attention to it.
Part I - A Brief overview of Habit.
I will give a brief conception of habit for the purpose of a historical account in which I will maintain a shift in the thinking of habit from the empirical account to a dualistic account. The purpose of this section is to engage in a brief yet essential understanding of habit which will dig beneath the surface of Deleuze to expose the metaphysical groundings in his claim of habit and the synthesis of time.
Beginning with Thomas Reid (1710-1796) in Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind (1788) whereby Reid accounts for habit as being principles of action, which simply put means every thing that incites us to act. Reid makes two distinctions of these principles of action, 'habit' and 'instinct'. It is important to distinguish these two principles of action, as Reid will ascertain by suggesting that both habit and instinct differ not in its nature but in its origin. Both principles of action operate without intention, but what separates them is a notion that instinct is natural whereas habit is acquired. Reid gives an account of instinct which I believe is a summary that can lead to this distinction made between the two principles, he writes:
[…] the aid of instinct, is, when the action must be done so suddenly that there is no time to think and determine. When a man loses his balance, either on foot or on horseback, he makes an instantaneous effort to recover it by instinct. The effort would be in vain, if it waited the determination of reason and will.
Reid appears to confirm that habit is the faculty of 'doing a thing' having done it 'frequently', that is to confirm the Aristotelian invocation of hexis in book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, whereby a specific hexis arises from the repetition of a specific kind of 'activity'. However, Reid it appears considers this invocation of repetition or frequency as “habits of art”, or skills. What Reid is seeking to identify is a principle of action which operates without intention. Reid will continue to discuss that this principle of action that is habit is difficult to remove or correct, and manifest themselves without any act of will. Reid makes the statement that we are 'carried by habit as if by a stream' if we make no 'resistance'. Although Reid makes an important distinction in the principle of action, he does not further a positive account of the acquisition or purpose of habit, and writes:
No man can show us a reason why our doing a thing frequently should produce either facility or inclination to do it.
However, following the appearance of the philosophical account of habit in the early 19th century France, we see further inquiry in the influential document of Xavier Bichat’s (1771-1802) Physiological Researches of Life and Death (1827) and further progressed by Maine de Biran’s (1766-1824) Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking (1802). Without going into great detail, Biran is referenced throughout Ravaisson’s Of Habit. What Biran draws upon is a discussion of habit in terms of dualism, whereby sensation through repetition is obscured or fades, and movement through repetition becomes more distinct. What Biran appears to be invoking in his dualist approach – between perception (activity) and sensation – is a retreat from conscious awareness, whereby activity becomes more precise and sensations fade away. Biran writes in an introductory remark in his 1802 text:
If there is then, as one cannot doubt, a sensitive activity, I will distinguish it from motor activity which alone I will call “activity”, because it is manifest to my inner sense with the greatest clearness.
This is perhaps where Ravaisson departs from, as the philosophical account of habit at this point begins a more thorough examination into what Ravaisson will call the 'double law of habit'. Ravaisson appears to refer to Biran’s account of habit and forms an interpretation of it which is suggestive that habit cannot be fully understood in mechanistic terms. Ravaisson writes:
Thus everywhere, in every circumstance, continuity or repetition – that is, duration – weakens passivity and excites activity. But in this story of agonistic powers there is a common trait […] Whenever a sensation is not painful, to the degree that it is prolonged or repeated – to the degree, consequently, that fades away – it becomes more and more of a need. Increasingly, if the impression that is necessary to provoke the sensation no longer occurs, one’s distress and unease reveal an impotence of desire in the realm of sensibility.
And of course, there is a footnote which directs us to Biran’s text, where he begins the claim that sensations fade and vanish in proportion to the passivity of their respective organs. And likewise, the notion of 'activity' and 'passivity' as seen in Ravaisson’s quote above can perhaps be further elucidated in Biran’s account. As Clare Carlisle perfectly summarises in her short text Between Freedom and Necessity, specifically under the section Background to Ravaisson’s Of Habit, Carlisle writes on passivity and activity in Biran:
One’s self can be identified with an impression of effort that is felt when the will, in initiating movement, encounters the resistance of the motor organs, which in turn encounter resistance of the motor organs, which in turn encounter resistance from external objects.
Carlisle goes on to discuss effort as being a meeting point between activity and passivity, or the will and resistance, thus causing a 'unity' of the two. As we have seen earlier, this unity of the motor activity and the sensation evokes the concept that repetition dulls the sensation and makes activity more precise. What Carlisle contends is that Biran is giving us a negative account of habit due to it blurring the distinctions of reason, that between the sensation and the activity a difference in change occurs (one dulls, the other becomes sharp) which cannot be explained by one instance of habit. However, Ravaisson commits to developing this metaphysical approach to habit and although acknowledges Biran throughout Of Habit, also tries to unify the dualistic approach. In doing so forms a notion that both passive and active habits occur by virtue of an 'obscure activity'. Ravaisson writes:
In activity, this [obscure activity] reproduces the action itself; in sensibility it does not reproduce the sensation, the passion – for this requires an external cause – but calls for it, invokes it; in a certain sense it implores the sensation.
Deleuze’s claim that habit is the foundation of time is not at all obvious when approaching the varied history of the philosophical account of habit. Likewise, when reading Bergson, it may not at all be obvious when he distinguishes between 'habit memory' and 'episodic memory' in Matter and Memory that there is a link to his precursor’s in the French tradition. Lovejoy points us in the direction of Ravaisson’s philosophical account of habit which gives a far more deep-routed historical interpretation in regards to both Bergson and Deleuze’s account.
Part II Bergson’s Duration and Ravaisson’s Organic and Inorganic Realm.
My first departure will be to outline what Bergson will call duration in his doctoral thesis Time and Free Will (1888). In this section I will claim that Bergson operates a rethinking of ordinary time, or our conscious intuition of time which I believe insinuates clock-time. I will pair this with his later work Matter and Memory (1896) whereby Bergson, I maintain, considers habit memory to unify the past and present. The claim I want to centralise in Time and Free Will takes place in the second chapter where Bergson seeks an experience of time which is non-quantifiable. Or at the very least, time that is irreducible to measurement, which I will explain is what Bergson goes on to call duration. I will furthermore locate a distinction that is remarkably similar with Ravaisson’s Of Habit. This philosophical link was made by Lovejoy in his essay Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson who maintains a genealogical relation between Bergson and Ravaisson, and goes on to claim that the aspect of time has not been closely analysed. I will inform this doctrine of time between Bergson and Ravaisson in light of Lovejoy’s own analysis.
In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the introductory remarks towards the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' imply that time is internal and space is external, Kant writes:
By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state […] and everything that belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time. [A22/B37]
Accordingly in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s treatment of a 'pure intuition of time' is in relation to arithmetic, Kant also treats space as geometry. Furthermore, what is suggested is that time cannot be outwardly intuited any more than space can be intuited as something within us. However, it appears that Bergson is not complicit with the resistance on part of the Kantian legacy which fails to challenge or extend any obfuscation that is invoked in these distinctions of spatiotemporality. Bergson in Time and Free Will calls upon psychiatrists and naturists amongst others and suggests that the Kantian conception may have even entered their intellectual projects 'undetected'. Bergson wants to 'unmix' space and time as he believes Kant is guilty of confusing the two. What Bergson in the second chapter sets out to distinguish is an experience of time which does not invoke space, that there has been a 'projection of time into space' despite the notion that time cannot be outwardly intuited. In order to think of this question of duration, Bergson instructs us to isolate consciousness from the external world. This notion of duration is opposed to the spatialization of time, or a conception of time which has a 'measurable magnitude'. Bergson further indicates a notion of this tendency to spatialize time by suggesting the enumeration of clock-time or the counting of a minute with the oscillation of a clock hand, Bergson writes:
[…]from the moment when you attribute the least homogeneity to duration, you surreptitiously introduce space. It is true we count successive moments of duration, and that, because of its relations with number, time at first seems to us to be a measurable magnitude, just like space […] If I picture these sixty oscillations to myself all at once by a single mental perception, I exclude by hypothesis the idea of a succession. I do not think of sixty strokes which succeed one another, but sixty points on a fixed line, each of which symbolizes […] an oscillation of the pendulum.
What Bergson wants to resist is the spatialization of time, he maintains that time once attempted to be measured is surreptitiously replaced by space. At this point we can bring in Ravaisson’s consideration of time which likewise is isolated from space, which is implied in the second chapter of his text Of Habit, Ravaisson writes:
But in time everything passes and nothing remains. How to measure this uninterrupted flux and also this limitless diffusion of succession, if not by something that does not change, but which subsists and remains? And what is this, if not me? For everything that belongs to space is outside time. Substance, at once inside and outside time, is found within me, as the measure of change and permanence alike, as the figure of identity.
Why does Ravaisson make the distinction between space and time?
Ravaisson opens the text with the consideration of space and time to distinguish the conditions under which being is represented, and consequently makes a distinction between the organic realm and inorganic realm, or the inertia and externality. The organic is where habit can take root, and the inorganic is what Ravaisson calls an 'elementary form of stability' and 'permanence'; I believe this suggests space as eternal presence. These distinctions are set to invoke that the organic -from the lowest sense such as vegetal to the highest conscious being - is capable of the contraction of habits. Whereas habit is not possible within the 'homogenous inorganic realm'. This I trust, separates the distinction as Bergson set out between time and space, or in Ravaisson’s sense the organic and the inorganic realm. We will later see how habit comes to be the unity of past and present to satisfy the claim that time without spatialization requires unity, or as Deleuze will attain; habit is the 'originary synthesis of time' which 'constitutes the life of the passing present'.
Bergson requires an isolation of consciousness from space, I believe that it is remarkably familiar to Ravaisson’s distinction between the organic and the inorganic, furthermore we will see that Bergson even considers habit memory to be the unification of time contra to the spatialization of time.
This will lead me to consider Bergson’s later text Matter and Memory and specifically the second chapter which furthers a conception of time that is thought as succession or qualitative. The thought of time as duration and the co-existing of past and present can be considered here, that through memory there is a convincing account of a synthesis of the past and the present with a view to the future which resists the spatialization of time. I want to firstly invoke a notion which Bergson opens the chapter with to bring an understanding of duration towards the figuration of the body. Bergson is suggestive of the body as a 'conductor' for the 'objects which act upon it', or that a fundamental distinction between past and present is mediated by the body which acts as a 'boundary' between the two. I want to consider that this is the introductory remark in Matter and Memory makes a clearer and more accessible claim which I believe was not sufficiently put across in Time and Free Will by the presentation of the body and its actions. What Bergson claims with the introduction of the body is that the past survives under two forms of memory; motor mechanisms and independent recollections, which when acted upon can merge time into a unity. That it is through the body that the past drives forward into the future, Bergson writes:
Everything, then, must happen as if an independent memory gathered images as they successively occur along the course of time: and as if our body, together with its surroundings, was never more than one among these images, the last, that which we obtain at any moment by making an instantaneous section in the general stream of becoming.
Bergson categorises these two forms of memory; habit memory (motor) and episodic (independent) memory. Bergson’s statement on habit memory is a hugely important distinction as it appears to be developing the doctrine of time originated in Ravaisson and likewise the philosophical account of habit. Bergson’s initial distinction is in the notion of the lesson or learning by heart which is not too dissimilar from the traditional account of habit. What Bergson suggests is that to learn by heart and to repeat an action such as reading a certain number of times, a unity is formed through the progress that repetition provides, this action is imprinted on the memory. Bergson summarises this point by claiming that the memory of the lesson has all the marks of a habit, and that like habit, it is acquired by the repetition of the same effort. However, what is important to distinguish here is the very action of the habit memory that is a re-presentation of actual past experience. I believe that this is a synthesis of time (as we will see with Deleuze), is a unification of past with present which anticipates the future. Whereas episodic memory can be considered as a representation, habit memory is an action of the body which directly addresses the past. As Bergson writes:
We become conscious of these mechanisms as they come into play; and this consciousness of a whole past of efforts stored up in the present is indeed also a memory, but a memory profoundly different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in the present and looking only to the future. It has retained from the past only the intelligently coordinated movement which represent the accumulated efforts of the past; and it recovers those past efforts, not in the memory-images which recall them, but in the definite order and systematic character with which the actual movements take place.
What appears to be at work in this consideration of habit memory is that it no longer represents our past to us, but acts it. Bergson appears to consider it a memory not because it conserves bygone images but because it prolongs and conserves their 'effect into the present'. Ravaisson makes a similar claim when he writes:
[…]continuity or repetition brings about a sort of obscure activity that increasingly anticipates both the impression of external objects in sensibility, and the will in activity. In activity, this reproduces the action itself[...]
In this sense, the body which contracts and subsequently acts out habits, which are a preservation of the past satisfies the initial claim of duration which unifies time as qualitative rather than quantitative. Furthermore, as we can see in Ravaisson’s account, the present moment of time is a unification of sensation and activity, one which recollects past experiences.
Conclusion - Deleuze and The First Synthesis of Time; Habit.
In the chapter Repetition for Itself in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze seems to provide an account of the synthesis of time in which Deleuze invokes both David Hume (1711-1776) and Bergson, Deleuze considers three accounts, habit, memory and a pure form of time. This section will outline Deleuze’s first synthesis which I believe is an elucidation of Bergson’s duration, this leads towards Deleuze’s claim that habit is the foundation of time. This will lead me to conclude that although Deleuze’s point is quite radical and bold, the metaphysical underpinnings potentially lead back to Ravaisson’s philosophical account of habit.
Deleuze draws David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature (1739) to begin the first synthesis in which he gives an account of cause and effect. I will further discuss this by giving an account of cause and effect which leads us towards an account of habit in Hume’s the Treatise and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). It is specifically in chapter V where Hume gives us this account of 'reason in experience' regarding cause and effect. Hume it seems, gives us the problem in an analogy of a person brought suddenly into the world and given their propensity to reason (or as Hume will ascertain, 'endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection'), that person would see a continual succession of objects – but would not be able to reach the idea of cause and effect. As Hume writes:
[…] in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of any thing beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.
What Hume invokes is a principle which determines a conclusion of a 'secret power' whereby one object’s impression produces the effect, this principle is habit or 'custom'. For the purpose of my thesis I will stick to the claim habit rather than the misleading implication of custom. Hume regards habit to be the 'guide of human life', in such a way that it invokes an anticipation for the future from appearances in the past. Without habit, reasoning cannot stretch beyond present sense experience. After experiencing a set of repetitious impressions, what comes to be is an account of what Hume calls “necessity” to their contiguity and succession, what cause brings to the mind is an anticipation of its effect. Deleuze uses the ‘AB’ argument to imply this concern:
Hume takes as an example the repetition of cases of the type AB, AB, AB, A … Each case or objective sequence AB is independent of the others […] whenever A appears. I expect the appearance of B.
It is not surprising then that Deleuze can make a philosophical link between Bergson and Hume, I believe they are both using habit as a re-presentation of the past in anticipation of the future. Deleuze will even explain that between Bergson’s example of habit memory and Hume’s own implication, there is a subtle connection, one offers a closed repetition and the other, open. Between Bergson’s habit memory and Hume’s notion of cause and effect, we can see why Deleuze will make the claim that habit anticipates the future on the basis of the past. Deleuze writes:
It is in the present that time is deployed. To it belong both the past and the future: the past in so far as the preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the future because its expectation is anticipated in this same contraction.
The present, as we can see in the inorganic realm is not a dimension of time but exists alone according to Deleuze, claiming that the past and the future are dimensions of the living present. What appears to be invoked is a systematisation of time which generates a field of past instances and a horizon of anticipation towards the future.
In conclusion, it would be a superficial interpretation of Deleuze if we we’re to look no further into the philosophical account of habit. Of course, Bergson’s account is perhaps an essential starting point towards a clear interpretation of Deleuze which we are pointed towards in the footnote Deleuze makes in regards to duration. However, in order to fully uncover the metaphysical underpinnings of Deleuze’s claim, we can look towards the philosophy of habit of which I have outlined. We can see significant links between Bergson and Ravaisson, primarily in the resistance towards a spatialization of time. Likewise, Bergson’s interpretation of habit also supposes a unity of time, or duration. I claim that Bergson is indebted to Ravaisson’s text which made the shift from the traditional philosophical account of habit to one juxtaposed with spatiotemporality. Deleuze’s claim that habit is the foundation of time, it could be said, originates in Ravaisson’s account. These conditions that Ravaisson outline in Of Habit appear to shift the philosophical account of habit away from the dualism of Biran, but furthermore towards Bergson’s account of duration and habit memory as the unification of time. Deleuze’s claim is both seminal and bold, to consider habit to be the foundation of time in regards to Bergson’s duration. However, Deleuze’s claim is only the surface of a huge underlying genealogy of the philosophical account of habit, one which leads us to regard the seminal impact of Ravaisson’s text.
Bergson, H. and Pogson, F. (1960). Time and free will. 1st ed. New York: Harper.
Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, W. (1912). Matter and memory. 1st ed. London: G. Allen & Co.
Bichat, X., Watkins, T. and Hallé, J. (1809). Physiological researches upon life and death. 1st ed. Philadelphia: Printed by Smith & Maxwell.
Biran, F., Boas, G. and Boehm, M. (1929). The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking ... Translated by Margaret Donaldson Boehm ... With an introduction by George Boas. 1st ed. Baillière & Co.: London; printed in America.
Cunningham, G. (1914). Bergson's Conception of Duration. The Philosophical Review, 23(5), p.525.
Deleuze, G. and Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Hume, D. (1768). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 1st ed. London: Printed for A. Miller.
Lovejoy, A. (1913). Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson. Mind, XXII(88), pp.465-483.
Ravaisson, F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum.
Reid, T. (1827). Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind. 1st ed. London: T. Tegg.
Smith, N. (2007). A commentary to Kant's Critique of pure reason. 4th ed. New York: Humanities Press.
Somers-Hall, H. (2013). Deleuze's Difference and repetition. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Sparrow, T. and Hutchinson, A. (2013). A History of Habit From Aristotle to Bourdieu. 1st ed. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
Wright, J. (2011). Ideas of Habit and Custom in Early Modern Philosophy. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42(1), pp.18-32.
 Deleuze, G. and Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic p 104
 Ibid. p 163
 Bergson, H. and Pogson, F. (1960). Time and free will. 1st ed. New York: Harper p 76
 Ravaisson, F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum p 25
 Ibid. p 27
 Reid, T. (1827). Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind. 1st ed. London: T. Tegg Mind p.486
 Ibid. p 489
 Ibid. p 495
 Ibid. p 492
 Ibid. p 496
 Ibid. p 497
 Biran, F., Boas, G. and Boehm, M. (1929). The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking. Translated by Margaret Donaldson Boehm. With an introduction by George Boas. 1st ed. Baillière & Co.: London; printed in America p 219
 Ibid. p 55
 Sparrow, T. and Hutchinson, A. (2013). A History of Habit From Aristotle to Bourdieu. 1st ed. Plymouth: Lexington Books. p 154
 Ravaisson, F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum. P 51
 Biran, F., Boas, G. and Boehm, M. (1929). The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking. Translated by Margaret Donaldson Boehm. With an introduction by George Boas. 1st ed. Baillière & Co.: London; printed in America. p 94
 Sparrow, T. and Hutchinson, A. (2013). A History of Habit From Aristotle to Bourdieu. 1st ed. Plymouth: Lexington Books. p 158
 Ravaisson, F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum p 51
 Lovejoy, A. (1913). Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson. Mind, XXII(88), p 468
 Bergson, H. and Pogson, F. (1960). Time and free will. 1st ed. New York: Harper p.92
 ibid p.104
 ibid p. 106
 Ravaisson, F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum. p 41
 Ibid. p 27
 Ibid. p 29
 Deleuze, G. and Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic p 105
 Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, W. (1912). Matter and Memory. 1st ed. London: G. Allen & Co. p. 87
 ibid p. 85
 Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, W. (1912). Matter and Memory. 1st ed. London: G. Allen & Co p 93
 Ravaisson, F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum. p 51
 Somers-Hall, H. (2013). Deleuze's Difference and repetition. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press p 72
 Hume, D. (1768). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 1st ed. London: Printed for A. Miller p.53
 Ibid p. 56
 Deleuze, G. and Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic p.136
 Deleuze, G. and Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic p.93
 Ibid. p.95
 Ibid. p.94
 Ibid. p.105