Introduction.
Gilles Deleuze in the second
chapter of Difference and Repetition (1962)
implies a series of statements which leads to the claim of habit being the first synthesis of time. In doing so
brings to light two seminal texts by Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Time and Free Will (1889) and his later
text Matter and Memory (1896). Between these two texts is an
important distinction that leads us to Deleuze’s consideration of habit being
the 'foundation of time'[1].
In this paper, I aim to dig beneath the surface of this claim made by Deleuze,
which will lead us to rethink the philosophical account of habit and to focus
our attention towards a consideration of time. I will impose a possible
philosophical link with Bergson’s precursor Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900). This
link has been made by Arthur Lovejoy (1873 -1962) who brought both Ravaisson
and Bergson together in his essay Some
Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson (1913) to address the thought of 'duration' (durée).
In a footnote to the chapter Repetition for Itself in his text Difference and Repetition, Deleuze leads
us to two works by Bergson:
The Bergson text
[in regards to Deleuze’s claim on duration
and quantifiable external-impressions]is
in Time and Free-will: An Essay on the
Immediate Data of Consciousness […] there, Bergson clearly distinguishes
the two aspects: fusion or contraction in the mind, and deployment in space.
Contraction as the essence of duration, and as operating on elementary material
agitations in order to constitute the perceived quality, is even more precisely
dealt with in Matter and Memory[2]
This will be the first position I
will undertake to acknowledge Deleuze’s claim of habit as the foundation of
time. I will begin with an outline of Bergson’s text Time and Free Will which gives us an initial account of duration. In the second chapter of the thesis,
Bergson responds to a confusion
between space and time in the Kantian system. His work seems to attempt to unmix and make clear distinctions of both
space and time. Bergson appears to rethink the ordinary conception of time into
what he will call duration, which I believe to be the unity of past and present
with the anticipation of future. In order for us to think of this question of
duration, Bergson maintains that we should isolate consciousness from space or
externality. Bergson gives a few examples to support a claim of the
spatialization of time. One of the allegorical examples is in the consideration
of counting a flock of sheep in a field. Each sheep is similar, or identical,
so in no sense is there any qualitative change in enumerating them[3].
The only method that the sheep can be counted is spatially, that is they are
counted in the stead of their spatiality. Therefore, in Bergson’s account,
quantitative multiplicities are 'homogenous'
and 'spatial'. What Bergson demands is
a thinking of time that is nonquantifiable and in succession rather than in
simultaneity, one of which is a unification of past, present with the
anticipation of the future.
In Time and Free Will alone, I maintain that there is not a positive
account of duration, however Bergson in Matter
and Memory appears to satisfy the initial claim of duration with the
implication of what he will call 'habit
memory'. This will confirm Deleuze’s suggestion that the qualitative
distinction is more precisely dealt with in Matter
and Memory. What appears in Matter
and Memory is of great importance to this thesis, as it invokes an account of
habit. Bergson defines habit as being
like a motor memory, which is considered next to episodic memory. What I will
go to explain is how Bergson reveals that habit as a form of memory acts out
past impressions in the present, in anticipation of the future. What I will go
on to argue from the position that Bergson undertakes, is a remarkably similar
position to Ravaisson’s Of Habit
(1838). I will claim that Ravaisson distinguishes between time and space by
eliciting the conception of the 'organic'
and the 'inorganic'. Ravaisson opens
with the remark that 'habit is change',
and that all 'change is realised in time'[4].
Whereas the inorganic, which we will see as being externality or space, in
Ravaisson’s claim is 'stability' and 'permanence'[5].
These claims become remarkably familiar when addressing Bergson’s texts, and
will allow us to expose the deeper philosophical foundations of Deleuze’s
claim. To put it in a more linear tense, Ravaisson conceives this notion of
space and time in regards to a metaphysical account of habit, Bergson develops
this account, Deleuze brings attention to it.
Part I - A Brief overview of Habit.
I will give a brief conception of
habit for the purpose of a historical account in which I will maintain a shift
in the thinking of habit from the empirical account to a dualistic account. The
purpose of this section is to engage in a brief yet essential understanding of
habit which will dig beneath the surface of Deleuze to expose the metaphysical
groundings in his claim of habit and the synthesis of time.
Beginning with Thomas Reid (1710-1796)
in Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind
(1788) whereby Reid accounts for habit as being principles of action[6],
which simply put means every thing
that incites us to act[7].
Reid makes two distinctions of these principles of action, 'habit' and 'instinct'[8].
It is important to distinguish these two principles of action, as Reid will
ascertain by suggesting that both habit and instinct differ not in its nature but in its origin[9].
Both principles of action operate without intention, but what separates them is
a notion that instinct is natural
whereas habit is acquired. Reid gives
an account of instinct which I believe is a summary that can lead to this
distinction made between the two principles, he writes:
[…] the aid of
instinct, is, when the action must be done so suddenly that there is no time to
think and determine. When a man loses his balance, either on foot or on
horseback, he makes an instantaneous effort to recover it by instinct. The
effort would be in vain, if it waited the determination of reason and will.[10]
Reid appears to confirm that habit
is the faculty of 'doing a thing' having
done it 'frequently'[11],
that is to confirm the Aristotelian invocation of hexis in book X of the Nicomachean
Ethics, whereby a specific hexis arises from the repetition of a specific
kind of 'activity'. However, Reid it
appears considers this invocation of repetition or frequency as “habits of
art”, or skills. What Reid is seeking to identify is a principle of action
which operates without intention. Reid
will continue to discuss that this principle of action that is habit is
difficult to remove or correct, and manifest themselves without any act of
will. Reid makes the statement that we are 'carried
by habit as if by a stream' if we make no 'resistance'[12].
Although Reid makes an important distinction in the principle of action, he
does not further a positive account of the acquisition or purpose of habit, and
writes:
No man can show
us a reason why our doing a thing frequently should produce either facility or
inclination to do it.[13]
However, following the appearance
of the philosophical account of habit in the early 19th century France, we see
further inquiry in the influential document of Xavier Bichat’s (1771-1802) Physiological Researches of Life and Death
(1827) and further progressed by Maine de Biran’s (1766-1824) Influence of Habit on the Faculty of
Thinking (1802). Without going into great detail, Biran is referenced
throughout Ravaisson’s Of Habit. What
Biran draws upon is a discussion of habit in terms of dualism, whereby sensation through repetition is obscured
or fades, and movement through repetition becomes more distinct[14].
What Biran appears to be invoking in his dualist approach – between perception
(activity) and sensation – is a retreat from conscious awareness, whereby
activity becomes more precise and sensations fade away. Biran writes in an
introductory remark in his 1802 text:
If there is
then, as one cannot doubt, a sensitive
activity, I will distinguish it from motor
activity which alone I will call “activity”, because it is manifest to my
inner sense with the greatest clearness.[15]
This is perhaps where Ravaisson
departs from, as the philosophical account of habit at this point begins a more
thorough examination into what Ravaisson will call the 'double law of habit'. Ravaisson appears to refer to Biran’s account
of habit and forms an interpretation of it which is suggestive that habit
cannot be fully understood in mechanistic terms[16].
Ravaisson writes:
Thus everywhere,
in every circumstance, continuity or repetition – that is, duration – weakens
passivity and excites activity. But in this story of agonistic powers there is
a common trait […] Whenever a sensation is not painful, to the degree that it
is prolonged or repeated – to the degree, consequently, that fades away – it
becomes more and more of a need. Increasingly, if the impression that is
necessary to provoke the sensation no longer occurs, one’s distress and unease
reveal an impotence of desire in the realm of sensibility.[17]
And of course, there is a footnote which
directs us to Biran’s text, where he begins the claim that sensations fade and
vanish in proportion to the passivity of their respective organs[18].
And likewise, the notion of 'activity'
and 'passivity' as seen in Ravaisson’s
quote above can perhaps be further elucidated in Biran’s account. As Clare
Carlisle perfectly summarises in her short text Between Freedom and Necessity, specifically under the section Background to Ravaisson’s Of Habit,
Carlisle writes on passivity and activity in Biran:
One’s self can
be identified with an impression of effort that is felt when the will, in
initiating movement, encounters the resistance of the motor organs, which in
turn encounter resistance of the motor organs, which in turn encounter
resistance from external objects.[19]
Carlisle goes on to discuss effort
as being a meeting point between activity
and passivity, or the will and resistance, thus causing a 'unity' of the two[20].
As we have seen earlier, this unity of the motor activity and the sensation
evokes the concept that repetition dulls the sensation and makes activity more
precise. What Carlisle contends is that Biran is giving us a negative account
of habit due to it blurring the distinctions of reason, that between the
sensation and the activity a difference in change occurs (one dulls, the other
becomes sharp) which cannot be explained by one instance of habit. However,
Ravaisson commits to developing this metaphysical approach to habit and
although acknowledges Biran throughout Of
Habit, also tries to unify the dualistic approach. In doing so forms a
notion that both passive and active habits occur by virtue of an 'obscure activity'[21].
Ravaisson writes:
In activity,
this [obscure activity] reproduces the action itself; in sensibility it does
not reproduce the sensation, the passion – for this requires an external cause
– but calls for it, invokes it; in a certain sense it implores the sensation.[22]
Deleuze’s claim that habit is the
foundation of time is not at all obvious when approaching the varied history of
the philosophical account of habit. Likewise, when reading Bergson, it may not
at all be obvious when he distinguishes between 'habit memory' and 'episodic
memory' in Matter and Memory that
there is a link to his precursor’s in the French tradition. Lovejoy points us
in the direction of Ravaisson’s philosophical account of habit which gives a
far more deep-routed historical interpretation in regards to both Bergson and
Deleuze’s account.
Part II Bergson’s Duration and Ravaisson’s Organic and Inorganic Realm.
My first departure will be to
outline what Bergson will call duration in his doctoral thesis Time and Free Will (1888). In this section I will claim that Bergson operates a
rethinking of ordinary time, or our conscious intuition of time which I believe
insinuates clock-time. I will pair this with his later work Matter and Memory (1896) whereby
Bergson, I maintain, considers habit memory to unify the past and present. The
claim I want to centralise in Time and
Free Will takes place in the second chapter where Bergson seeks an
experience of time which is non-quantifiable. Or at the very least, time that
is irreducible to measurement, which I will explain is what Bergson goes on to
call duration. I will furthermore locate a distinction that is remarkably similar
with Ravaisson’s Of Habit. This
philosophical link was made by Lovejoy in his essay Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson who maintains a
genealogical relation between Bergson and Ravaisson, and goes on to claim that
the aspect of time has not been closely analysed[23].
I will inform this doctrine of time between Bergson and Ravaisson in light of
Lovejoy’s own analysis.
In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the introductory remarks towards the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' imply that time
is internal and space is external, Kant writes:
By means of
outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as
outside us, and all without exception in space. In space their shape,
magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. Inner
sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state […] and
everything that belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in
relations of time. [A22/B37]
Accordingly in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s
treatment of a 'pure intuition of time'
is in relation to arithmetic, Kant also treats space as geometry. Furthermore,
what is suggested is that time cannot be outwardly intuited any more than space
can be intuited as something within us. However, it appears that Bergson is not
complicit with the resistance on part of the Kantian legacy which fails to
challenge or extend any obfuscation that is invoked in these distinctions of spatiotemporality.
Bergson in Time and Free Will calls upon
psychiatrists and naturists amongst others and suggests that the Kantian
conception may have even entered their intellectual projects 'undetected'[24].
Bergson wants to 'unmix' space and time
as he believes Kant is guilty of confusing the two. What Bergson in the second
chapter sets out to distinguish is an experience of time which does not invoke
space, that there has been a 'projection
of time into space' despite the notion that time cannot be outwardly
intuited. In order to think of this question of duration, Bergson instructs us
to isolate consciousness from the external world. This notion of duration is
opposed to the spatialization of time, or a conception
of time which has a 'measurable magnitude'.
Bergson further indicates a notion of this tendency to spatialize time by
suggesting the enumeration of clock-time or the counting of a minute with the
oscillation of a clock hand, Bergson writes:
[…]from the
moment when you attribute the least homogeneity to duration, you
surreptitiously introduce space. It is true we count successive moments of
duration, and that, because of its relations with number, time at first seems
to us to be a measurable magnitude, just like space […] If I picture these
sixty oscillations to myself all at once by a single mental perception, I exclude
by hypothesis the idea of a succession. I do not think of sixty strokes which
succeed one another, but sixty points on a fixed line, each of which symbolizes
[…] an oscillation of the pendulum.[25]
What Bergson wants to resist is the
spatialization of time, he maintains that time once attempted to be measured is
surreptitiously replaced by space[26].
At this point we can bring in Ravaisson’s consideration of time which likewise
is isolated from space, which is implied in the second chapter of his text Of Habit, Ravaisson writes:
But in time
everything passes and nothing remains. How to measure this uninterrupted flux
and also this limitless diffusion of succession, if not by something that does
not change, but which subsists and remains? And what is this, if not me? For
everything that belongs to space is outside time. Substance, at once inside and
outside time, is found within me, as the measure of change and permanence
alike, as the figure of identity.[27]
Why does Ravaisson make the
distinction between space and time?
Ravaisson opens the text with the
consideration of space and time to distinguish the conditions under which being is represented[28],
and consequently makes a distinction between the organic realm and inorganic
realm, or the inertia and externality. The organic is where habit can take
root, and the inorganic is what Ravaisson calls an 'elementary form of stability' and 'permanence'[29];
I believe this suggests space as eternal presence. These distinctions are set
to invoke that the organic -from the lowest sense such as vegetal to the
highest conscious being - is capable of the contraction of habits. Whereas
habit is not possible within the 'homogenous
inorganic realm'[30].
This I trust, separates the distinction as Bergson set out between time and
space, or in Ravaisson’s sense the organic and the inorganic realm. We will
later see how habit comes to be the unity of past and present to satisfy the
claim that time without spatialization requires unity, or as Deleuze will
attain; habit is the 'originary synthesis
of time' which 'constitutes the life of the passing present'[31].
Bergson requires an isolation of
consciousness from space, I believe that it is remarkably familiar to
Ravaisson’s distinction between the organic and the inorganic, furthermore we
will see that Bergson even considers habit memory to be the unification of time
contra to the spatialization of time.
This will lead me to consider
Bergson’s later text Matter and Memory
and specifically the second chapter which furthers a conception of time that is
thought as succession or qualitative. The thought of time as duration and the
co-existing of past and present can be considered here, that through memory
there is a convincing account of a synthesis of the past and the present with a
view to the future which resists the spatialization of time. I want to firstly
invoke a notion which Bergson opens the chapter with to bring an understanding
of duration towards the figuration of the body. Bergson is suggestive of the
body as a 'conductor' for the 'objects which act upon it', or that a
fundamental distinction between past and present is mediated by the body which
acts as a 'boundary' between the two. I
want to consider that this is the introductory remark in Matter and Memory makes a clearer and more accessible claim which I
believe was not sufficiently put across in Time
and Free Will by the presentation of the body and its actions. What Bergson
claims with the introduction of the body is that the past survives under two
forms of memory; motor mechanisms and independent recollections[32],
which when acted upon can merge time into a unity. That it is through the body
that the past drives forward into the future, Bergson writes:
Everything,
then, must happen as if an independent memory gathered images as they
successively occur along the course of time: and as if our body, together with
its surroundings, was never more than one among these images, the last, that
which we obtain at any moment by making an instantaneous section in the general
stream of becoming.[33]
Bergson categorises these two forms
of memory; habit memory (motor) and episodic (independent) memory. Bergson’s
statement on habit memory is a hugely important distinction as it appears to be
developing the doctrine of time originated in Ravaisson and likewise the
philosophical account of habit. Bergson’s initial distinction is in the notion
of the lesson or learning by heart which is not too dissimilar from the
traditional account of habit. What Bergson suggests is that to learn by heart
and to repeat an action such as reading a certain number of times, a unity is
formed through the progress that repetition provides, this action is imprinted
on the memory. Bergson summarises this point by claiming that the memory of the
lesson has all the marks of a habit, and that like habit, it is acquired by the
repetition of the same effort. However, what is important to distinguish here
is the very action of the habit memory that is a re-presentation of actual past
experience. I believe that this is a synthesis of time (as we will see with
Deleuze), is a unification of past with present which anticipates the future.
Whereas episodic memory can be considered as a representation, habit memory is
an action of the body which directly addresses the past. As Bergson writes:
We become
conscious of these mechanisms as they come into play; and this consciousness of
a whole past of efforts stored up in the present is indeed also a memory, but a
memory profoundly different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in
the present and looking only to the future. It has retained from the past only
the intelligently coordinated movement which represent the accumulated efforts
of the past; and it recovers those past efforts, not in the memory-images which
recall them, but in the definite order and systematic character with which the
actual movements take place.[34]
What appears to be at work in this
consideration of habit memory is that it no longer represents our past to us,
but acts it. Bergson appears to consider it a memory not because it conserves bygone images but because it prolongs
and conserves their 'effect into the present'[35].
Ravaisson makes a similar claim when he writes:
[…]continuity or
repetition brings about a sort of obscure activity that increasingly
anticipates both the impression of external objects in sensibility, and the
will in activity. In activity, this reproduces the action itself[...][36]
In this sense, the body which
contracts and subsequently acts out habits, which are a preservation of the
past satisfies the initial claim of duration which unifies time as qualitative
rather than quantitative. Furthermore, as we can see in Ravaisson’s account,
the present moment of time is a unification of sensation and activity, one
which recollects past experiences.
Conclusion - Deleuze and The First Synthesis of Time; Habit.
In the chapter Repetition for Itself in Difference
and Repetition, Deleuze seems to provide an account of the synthesis of
time in which Deleuze invokes both David Hume (1711-1776) and Bergson, Deleuze
considers three accounts, habit, memory and a pure form of time[37].
This section will outline Deleuze’s first synthesis which I believe is an
elucidation of Bergson’s duration, this leads towards Deleuze’s claim that
habit is the foundation of time. This will lead me to conclude that although
Deleuze’s point is quite radical and bold, the metaphysical underpinnings potentially
lead back to Ravaisson’s philosophical account of habit.
Deleuze draws David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature (1739) to begin
the first synthesis in which he gives an account of cause and effect. I will
further discuss this by giving an account of cause and effect which leads us
towards an account of habit in Hume’s the Treatise
and An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding (1748). It is specifically in chapter V where Hume gives us this
account of 'reason in experience'
regarding cause and effect. Hume it
seems, gives us the problem in an analogy of a person brought suddenly into the
world and given their propensity to reason (or as Hume will ascertain, 'endowed with the strongest faculties of
reason and reflection'), that person would see a continual succession of
objects – but would not be able to reach the idea of cause and effect. As Hume
writes:
[…] in a word,
such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or
reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of any thing beyond what
was immediately present to his memory and senses.[38]
What Hume invokes is a principle
which determines a conclusion of a 'secret
power' whereby one object’s impression produces the effect, this principle
is habit or 'custom'. For the purpose of my thesis I will stick to the claim habit rather than the misleading
implication of custom. Hume regards
habit to be the 'guide of human life',
in such a way that it invokes an anticipation for the future from appearances
in the past[39].
Without habit, reasoning cannot stretch beyond present sense
experience. After experiencing a set of repetitious impressions, what comes to
be is an account of what Hume calls “necessity” to their contiguity and succession, what cause brings to the mind is an
anticipation of its effect[40].
Deleuze uses the ‘AB’ argument to imply this concern:
Hume takes as an
example the repetition of cases of the type AB, AB, AB, A … Each case or
objective sequence AB is independent of the others […] whenever A appears. I
expect the appearance of B.[41]
It is not surprising then that
Deleuze can make a philosophical link between Bergson and Hume, I believe they
are both using habit as a re-presentation of the past in anticipation of the
future. Deleuze will even explain that between Bergson’s example of habit
memory and Hume’s own implication, there is a subtle connection, one offers a closed repetition and the other, open[42].
Between Bergson’s habit memory and Hume’s notion of cause and effect, we can
see why Deleuze will make the claim that habit anticipates the future on the
basis of the past. Deleuze writes:
It is in the
present that time is deployed. To it belong both the past and the future: the
past in so far as the preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the
future because its expectation is anticipated in this same contraction.[43]
The present, as we can see in the
inorganic realm is not a dimension of time but exists alone according to
Deleuze[44],
claiming that the past and the future are dimensions of the living present. What appears to be invoked is a systematisation of
time which generates a field of past instances and a horizon of anticipation
towards the future.
In conclusion, it would be a
superficial interpretation of Deleuze if we we’re to look no further into the
philosophical account of habit. Of course, Bergson’s account is perhaps an
essential starting point towards a clear interpretation of Deleuze which we are
pointed towards in the footnote Deleuze makes in regards to duration. However,
in order to fully uncover the metaphysical underpinnings of Deleuze’s claim, we
can look towards the philosophy of habit of which I have outlined. We can see
significant links between Bergson and Ravaisson, primarily in the resistance
towards a spatialization of time. Likewise, Bergson’s interpretation of habit
also supposes a unity of time, or duration. I claim that Bergson is indebted to
Ravaisson’s text which made the shift from the traditional philosophical
account of habit to one juxtaposed with spatiotemporality. Deleuze’s claim that
habit is the foundation of time, it could be said, originates in Ravaisson’s
account. These conditions that Ravaisson outline in Of Habit appear to shift the philosophical account of habit away
from the dualism of Biran, but furthermore towards Bergson’s account of
duration and habit memory as the unification of time. Deleuze’s claim is both
seminal and bold, to consider habit to be the foundation of time in regards to
Bergson’s duration. However, Deleuze’s claim is only the surface of a huge
underlying genealogy of the philosophical account of habit, one which leads us
to regard the seminal impact of Ravaisson’s text.
References/Bibliography
Bergson, H. and Pogson, F. (1960). Time and free will. 1st ed.
New York: Harper.
Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, W. (1912). Matter and memory.
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Bichat, X., Watkins, T. and Hallé, J. (1809). Physiological
researches upon life and death. 1st ed. Philadelphia: Printed by Smith &
Maxwell.
Biran, F., Boas, G. and Boehm, M. (1929). The Influence of
Habit on the Faculty of Thinking ... Translated by Margaret Donaldson Boehm ...
With an introduction by George Boas. 1st ed. Baillière & Co.: London;
printed in America.
Cunningham, G. (1914). Bergson's Conception of Duration. The
Philosophical Review, 23(5), p.525.
Deleuze, G. and Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st
ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Hume, D. (1768). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, An
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 1st ed. London: Printed for A.
Miller.
Lovejoy, A. (1913). Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson. Mind,
XXII(88), pp.465-483.
Ravaisson, F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of habit.
1st ed. London: Continuum.
Reid, T. (1827). Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind. 1st ed.
London: T. Tegg.
Smith, N. (2007). A commentary to Kant's Critique of pure reason.
4th ed. New York: Humanities Press.
Somers-Hall, H. (2013). Deleuze's Difference and repetition. 1st
ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Sparrow, T. and Hutchinson, A. (2013). A History of Habit From
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Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42(1), pp.18-32.
[1] Deleuze, G. and
Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury
Academic p 104
[2] Ibid. p 163
[3] Bergson, H. and
Pogson, F. (1960). Time and free will. 1st ed. New York: Harper p 76
[4] Ravaisson,
F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of
Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum p 25
[5]
Ibid. p 27
[6] Reid, T. (1827). Essays
on the Powers of the Human Mind. 1st ed. London: T. Tegg Mind p.486
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Ibid. p 489
[9]
Ibid. p 495
[10]
Ibid. p 492
[11] Ibid.
p 496
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Ibid. p 497
[14] Biran,
F., Boas, G. and Boehm, M. (1929). The
Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking. Translated by Margaret
Donaldson Boehm. With an introduction by George Boas. 1st ed. Baillière &
Co.: London; printed in America p 219
[15]
Ibid. p 55
[16] Sparrow, T. and
Hutchinson, A. (2013). A History of Habit From Aristotle to Bourdieu.
1st ed. Plymouth: Lexington Books. p 154
[17] Ravaisson,
F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of
Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum.
P 51
[18] Biran,
F., Boas, G. and Boehm, M. (1929). The
Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking. Translated by Margaret
Donaldson Boehm. With an introduction by George Boas. 1st ed. Baillière &
Co.: London; printed in America. p 94
[19] Sparrow, T. and
Hutchinson, A. (2013). A History of Habit From Aristotle to Bourdieu.
1st ed. Plymouth: Lexington Books. p 158
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ravaisson,
F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of
Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum p 51
[22]
Ibid.
[23] Lovejoy, A. (1913).
Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson. Mind, XXII(88), p 468
[24] Bergson, H. and
Pogson, F. (1960). Time and free will. 1st ed. New York: Harper p.92
[25] ibid
p.104
[26] ibid
p. 106
[27] Ravaisson,
F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of
Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum.
p 41
[28]
Ibid. p 27
[29]
Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
p 29
[31] Deleuze, G. and
Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury
Academic p 105
[32] Bergson, H., Paul,
N. and Palmer, W. (1912). Matter and Memory.
1st ed. London: G. Allen & Co. p. 87
[33] ibid
p. 85
[34] Bergson, H., Paul,
N. and Palmer, W. (1912). Matter and
Memory. 1st ed. London: G. Allen & Co p 93
[35]
Ibid.
[36] Ravaisson,
F., Carlisle, C. and Sinclair, M. (2008). Of
Habit. 1st ed. London: Continuum. p 51
[37] Somers-Hall, H.
(2013). Deleuze's Difference and repetition. 1st ed. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press p 72
[38] Hume, D. (1768). An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals. 1st ed. London: Printed for A. Miller p.53
[39] Ibid p. 56
[40] Deleuze, G. and
Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury
Academic p.136
[41] Deleuze, G. and
Patton, P. (2014). Difference and repetition. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury
Academic p.93
[42]
Ibid. p.95
[43]
Ibid. p.94
[44]
Ibid. p.105