Rosi Braidotti’s contribution to Deleuze and Feminist Theory (2000), Teratologies, reads from Gilles Deleuze
a rethinking of the embodied structure of human subjectivity[1].
Braidotti recognises a shift from teleological perfectibility of the human
which has been the aim of essentialism, which she claims has ‘spilled over’, and
reduced the human body to a surface of representation[2].
In this essay, I will be taking
Braidotti’s emphasis on Deleuze to instruct us through the hugely complex
expression of ‘becoming’, which I will discuss between Deleuze’s early project Bergsonism (Le Bergsonisme 1966) and in his later collaboration with Felix
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (Mille Plateaux 1987).
The posthuman condition which I
will be responding to stems from Braidotti’s own expression, in which she
remarks;
[the aim of] the theoretical masters of
nihilistic postmodern aesthetics [...] [is] to launch a sort of euphoric celebration
of virtual embodiments[3].
This claim regarding the posthuman
condition, holds a dissolution of the integrity of the human subject as a
disjunction against the centrality of human identity in Western philosophy. What
constitutes the posthuman condition can be fractured into parts; inhuman,
nonhuman, all-too-human, anti-anthropocentricism etc., all of which appear
across various discourses[4].
The term is multifaceted and it would be reductive of me to attempt to define
it succinctly. However, this essay will attempt to demonstrate how an emphasis
on nonhuman relations correlate to a criticism of Western discourse, whereby
human identity is central and privileged. The term can better be thought of as
anti-anthropocentricism; Deleuze’s collaboration with Guattari pervades inhuman
or nonhuman agents, whereby a philosophy of becoming is contrary to the static
or homogeneity of the ‘philosophy of being’.
Following Braidotti’s text, my
initial exploration will lead me to the third chapter in Deleuze’s project Bergsonism, Memory as Virtual Co-existence. Here, we will see how Deleuze
breaks away from the dominance of ‘being’, whereby through an ontological
reading of Henri Bergson’s Matter and
Memory (Matiére et Mémoire 1911),
Deleuze recognises a collapse in the foundations on which memory comes into actualisation.
This idea, I will argue, overcomes the deep bodily roots of subjectivity, by
which being is actualised from ‘virtuality’, or a non-human reality.
The implications of Deleuze’s
reading of Bergson will lead us towards the ontology of becoming, which for
Deleuze works as a criticism of the philosophy of being[5].
Braidotti will then lead me towards the chapter 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible… to
be found in A Thousand Plateaus,
drawing on a reading of Baruch Spinoza and Bergson (which Deleuze considers
philosophers of difference) to develop an ‘ethology’. I will conclude that
Deleuze and Guattari, through prioritising becoming above being, dissolve the
sovereignty of the human subject.
Part 1: The ‘Deleuzean Body’ as ‘Enfleshed Memory’.
Braidotti opens the inquiry in the
section Enfleshed Complexities of Teratologies with an outline of what she
calls the ‘Deleuzean body’. Braidotti initially gives a genealogy of Deleuze’s
influences, but it is how Deleuze treats these influences which must first be
acknowledged. In Lettre á Michel Cressole
(1973) Deleuze writes that he imagines himself latching onto the back of
philosophers to impregnate them, ‘giving him a child, which would be his and
which would at the same time be a monster.’ Deleuze goes on to say that the
author has said everything that Deleuze has made him say, so this child/monster
must go through ‘decenterings, slips, breaks, ins, secret emissions’[6].
Braidotti likewise acknowledges this in Deleuze and goes onto suggest a
genealogy:
For Deleuze, the
genealogy of the embodied nature of the subject can be ironically rendered as:
Descartes’ nightmare, Spinoza’s hope, Nietzsche’s complaint, Freud’s obsession,
Lacan’s favourite fantasy, Marx’s omission.[7]
I believe that Braiotti missed an
essential component to Deleuze’s transformed authors and philosophers; Henri Bergson.
Deleuze considers in his text Bergsonism
to be the ‘classic case’ of the analogy he made to Cressole[8].
Braidotti recognises a
transformation of concepts which Deleuze traces out of Bergson, in describing what
she calls the ‘Deleuzean body’. Braidotti tells us that this body or subject is
a ‘piece of meat activated by electrical waves of desire’[9],
Braidotti appears to suggest a dissolving of identity and a reconstruction of a
new materialist body. However, I want to draw attention to her remark on
Deleuze, in which she writes:
The Deleuzean
body is ultimately an embodied memory.[10]
This remark leads me to an
exploration of Deleuze’s project Bergsonism,
whereby in the third chapter Memory as
Virtual Coexistence Deleuze explores the third chapter of Bergson’s Matter and Memory, in which Deleuze questions
the status of past recollections and their impression on the present. Deleuze
transforms Bergson’s ‘psychological’ account of the past and imposes an
ontological unconsciousness.
Firstly, Deleuze addresses the ‘false
problem’ in Bergson’s Matter and Memory
“where are recollections preserved?”. Likewise, Bergson asks this very question
in the third chapter:
We understand
that the psycho-chemical phenomena take place in the brain, that the brain is in
the body, the body in the air which
surrounds it, etc. ; but the past, once achieved, if it is retained, where is
it?[11]
Bergson, like Deleuze recognises
that these memories are ‘in time’[12]
which calls up duration. Duration, fully explored in his earlier text Time and Free Will (Essai sur Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience 1888), sets the
foundations of Matter and Memory, in
suggesting that temporality is intuition. That is, the present is a perception
of the immediate past with the anticipation or determination of the immediate
future[13].
In Matter and Memory, Bergson gives us the example that every
perception is already a memory, that we practically only ever perceive the
past, and the pure present as ‘being the invisible progress of the past gnawing
into the future’[14].
To further understand Deleuze’s
project, I will outline Bergson’s inverted cone diagram which is found in the
third chapter of Matter and Memory[15].
Bergson poses the problem of living ‘only in the present’, that is, absent of
memory or experience. He calls up this issue by suggesting that it is a quality
of the ‘lower animal’, which reacts in surprise by immediate stimulus, or the
man of impulse. Likewise, to live in
the past, as Bergson so clearly writes, is not a man of impulse ‘but a
dreamer’. That is to say, to live in the past absent of any advantage over the
present, is futile[16].
Bergson draws us towards the cone
diagram[17],
which sits on a flat plane, or as Bergson calls it ‘plane of my actual
representation of the universe’, which is essentially reality. The inverted
cone’s point is labelled S, and as it expands has concentric circuits labelled
A”, B”, and further up A’, B’, to A and B. The concentric circuits labelled A
and B symbolise the multitudinous images of memories. The memories become more
and more varied or multiple as the cone extends. However, as it draws in towards
point S, they become more defined and organise themselves towards the present.
The point S is where the memory participates in the place of present reality,
or the actual representation of the universe[18].
Bergson writes:
A recollection
should reappear in consciousness, it is necessary that it should descend from
the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where action is taking
place[19].
My understanding of the cone
diagram is that Bergson shows us how memories or the virtual materialize into
action, they become present. Memories cause sensations as it materialises, and
as it materializes, according to Bergson, the recollection diminishes from its
status as a memory, as it passes into the state of the present[20].
The memory becomes something actually lived, this notion of the past is
considered virtual. The virtual is the depths the past, and as Bergson has
shown the virtual becomes actual, actual being a sensation acted upon or
capable of provoking movement[21].
Bergson writes:
But the truth is
that we shall never reach the past unless we frankly place ourselves within it.
Essentially virtual, it cannot be known as something past unless we follow and
adopt the movement by which it expands into a present image, thus emerging from
obscurity into the light of day.[22]
If we consider the recognition of a
face, we have to call up past memories. Should the face be of a near relative
who you see every week then the memories will be distinct and will take little
effort to materialize. The face of a person you went to school with thirty
years ago might take a little longer to place, thus we retreat into
recollection which exists as an aggregate of images, or the virtual, in which
we refine the memory until we can place it into the present or the actual. The
very consideration of the face being recognised could be thought of as the past
or recollection materialising, thus it appears that past has an advance on the
present. Hypothetically, should we never have this position of recollection,
then we would be in constant surprise or confusion every time we meet that same
close relative.
When Deleuze draws out the
distinction in Bergson of where memories or recollections are preserved, he is
responding to Bergson where he tells us that the body cannot store up these
images, and that it is a ‘chimerical enterprise’ to seek recollections or the past
perceptions in the brain, as it is not the recollection that is in the brain
but the brain that is in the recollections[23].
Deleuze recognises in Bergson that recollection is preserved in duration, and following
the concept of duration tells us that recollection is preserved in itself [24].
Given that Deleuze recognises in
Bergson that recollection is not to be located in the brain (as the brain is
considered matter and part of the material world), he then goes on to discuss what
he calls the extra-psychological range emphasized in Bergson’s text. Deleuze
writes:
What Bergson
calls “pure recollection” has no psychological existence. This is why it is
called virtual, inactive, and unconscious […] we must nevertheless be clear at
this point that Bergson does not use the word “unconscious” to denote a
psychological reality outside consciousness, but to denote a nonpsychological
reality – being as it is in itself.[25]
Deleuze tells us that it is the
present that is psychological, however it is the past that is ontological, or
at the very least has ontological significance. Deleuze continues by raising a
distinction in Bergson, where Bergson begins to discuss how we go to call up a
recollection. That is, like the face recognition metaphor I used earlier, how
we detach ourselves from the present in order to place ourselves into the past,
and eventually in a particular position in the past. Bergson says that we
‘become conscious of an act sui generis’, or of its own kind (unique).
This notion of placing ourselves into the past, Bergson tells us, is like the
focussing of a camera, adjusting to the multitude and distinguishing the one.
Bergson, goes on to tell us that the recollection remains virtual, and as we
refine the memory it passes into the actual[26].
Deleuze reiterates and transforms this notion of placing ourselves into the
past by suggesting a genuine leap, or
a leap into ontology. That we leap
into the past, into the nonpsychological reality:
We really leap
into being, into being-in-itself, into the being in itself of the past. It is a
case of leaving psychology altogether.[27]
As I understand this, the present
requires the past which is essentially ontological, and Deleuze’s reading of
Bergson tells us that the psychological is not in fact the unconscious as we
would know it after Freud, but refers to a nonpsychological reality. My
argument lies in this distinction of a leap into the nonpsychological, which I maintain
decentres the human subject and shifts the dominance of being (designating
being as it is in itself)[28],
Deleuze writes:
[…] once the
leap has been made, that recollection will gradually take on a psychological
existence […] and gradually we give it an embodiment, a “psychologization”.[29]
Looking back at Braidotti’s claim
in regards to the Deleuzean body being an embodied memory, the very
consideration of the leap into the virtual for it to materialize shifts the
condition of being to an inhuman realm. Being in its state of arrest or
subordination leads Deleuze to develop his ontology of becoming, which for Deleuze
works as a criticism of philosophies of being[30].
In consideration to the discussion above, we can see how Deleuze collapses
being into a nonpsyhcological reality, shifting the centrality of the human
subject. Deleuze speaks of becoming in the earlier passage in Bergsonism, Duration as Immediate Datum, in this he tells us that duration (as
it appears in Time and Free Will, and
furthermore Creative Evolution (L'Évolution Créatrice 1911) is
becoming. A becoming which endures[31],
it is not a change from A to B, but the process between two parts. Becoming can
be defined with reference to Bergson’s duration, proposing an entity which
endures though a series of continuous transformations.
Part 2: Memories of a Spinozist (I); Movement and Rest/Speeds and
Slowness
The philosophy of becoming, I will
argue, is a form of anti-essentialism or neovitalism which is interlinked with
the posthuman condition. Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming relies on the
posthuman not in order to replace the privileged image of man with another
model which rethinks the emergence of life, but collapses the foundations of
being with an affirmation of becoming. Braidotti leads us towards the
philosophy of becoming as expressed in Deleuze’s collaborative text with
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, she
writes:
Deleuze's
emphasis on the project of reconfiguring the positivity of difference, his
philosophy of becoming and the emphasis he places on thinking about changes and
the speed of transformation are a very illuminating way to approach the
complexities of our age[32].
Deleuze and Guattari refer to
various kinds of becomings in A Thousand
Plateaus, such as becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-animal,
becoming-molecular and becoming-imperceptible. Becoming is not a kind of
metamorphosis, from human to animal for example, it is not a change per say,
but change is what becoming effects[33].
Rather than think of becoming as a change or metamorphosis, or from a start to
the final transformation, to think of becoming is to acknowledge the endurance of
change; it is the passage between points.
Deleuze in a reading of Nietzsche
constructs a philosophy of becoming, Braidotti considers Deleuze to be ‘essentially
Bergson and Nietzsche’. However, from Braidotti’s claim that the philosophy of
becoming as the speed of transformation or changes, leads me towards Deleuze
and Guattari’s first account of Spinoza. There are two aspects of Spinoza I
will explore which is put to work when addressing becomings, the first that I
will address is in the notion of speed and slowness. If we look at the chapter 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal,
Becoming-Imperceptible and specifically the short section titled Memories of a Spinozist I, Deleuze and
Guattari write:
Substantial or
essential forms have been critiqued in many different ways. Spinoza’s approach
is radical: Arrive at elements that no longer have either form or function,
that are abstracted in this sense even though they are perfectly real. They are
distinguished solely by movement and rest, slowness and speed[34].
What Deleuze and Guattari
acknowledge in Spinoza, and as we will see regarding Ethics (Ethica, Ordine
Geometrico Demonstrate 1677), is a rethinking of what a thing is without
having to return to substantial or essential forms. What we will see in Deleuze
and Guattari’s reading of Spinoza is a thought of becoming, where a thing can
enter into becomings, which is perhaps restricted or subordinated when returning
to the substantial forms.
Spinoza writes at IIL7S in Ethics, that ‘the whole of nature is one
individual’, whereby all things, all bodies and their parts ‘vary in infinite
ways, without any change to the whole individual’[35].
What Spinoza is alluding to here is
the whole universe which he is explaining as being one infinite individual,
which is in turn composed of an infinite number of individual parts, which
includes a further series of individuals. As Spinoza writes at IIP8, every
substance is ‘necessarily infinite’[36].
The notion of the continuum, within
which things move and exist unities all physical bodies, all according to
Spinoza are one continuous physical body, Spinoza writes at 11P11:
God, or a substance consisting of infinite
attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily
exists.[37]
Thus, if the universe is expressed
as a single physical continuum, that everything is in substance (God)[38]
as Spinoza puts forth, then how can we distinguish between two physical bodies?
Given that things or bodies are traditionally differentiated by their
substance?
Spinoza contends that things are
distinguished by the ratio of motion, speed and rest, amongst their parts. In
his ‘physical digression’[39],
we see that all bodies either move or are at rest (IIA1’). Bodies are
distinguished from each other by ‘reason
of motion and rest, speed and slowness’ above reason of substance (IIL1).
Bodies are in agreement with each other, as Spinoza tells us, a body at rest,
for example, is determined by a body in motion, and so on ad infinitum. So, my leg is differentiated from the table leg next
to it by motion, whereas my leg has the capacity for motion, the table leg is
determined by rest, so it could be said that there is nothing physically recognisable
that distinguishes one individual (my leg) to another (the table leg), except
their capacity for motion.
Spinoza tells us at IIA2”[40]
that when several bodies move at the same degree of speed, or when ‘they communicate their motions to each other
in a certain fixed manner’[41],
they form a unity. For example, when a person rides a bike, ‘those bodies are united with one and other
[so] that they all together compose one body or individual’[42],
the bike and the person (cyclist) unite as one.
It appears that, on the basis that
a body is distinguished based on relations of motion, that the integrity of
human identity vanishes, and is distinguished against the universe in terms of
other capacities of motion.
Spinoza talks of the human body as
being composed of a multitude of individual parts. He writes in IIL7[43]
that a human body is itself a composite individual, composed of many individual
natures. Some of these individuals within the human body are composed of fluids
(i.e. blood), some individuals are soft (i.e. flesh), others are hard (i.e.
bone). Spinoza considers that these individual components of the human body are
affected by other external bodies.
Deleuze and Guattari read in
Spinoza that these individual elements (which are part of an actual infinity)
are laid out on a ‘plane of consistency’. They consider these parts as not being
defined by number or structure but rather ‘by virtue of the composition of the
relation into which their parts enter’. That is, the composition of movement
when I write with a pencil and the decomposition is when I put the pencil down[44].
The implication of this initial reading of Spinoza which Deleuze and Guattari
transpose to their own thinking, is that becoming is possible surrounding the
account of rest to motion. As I understand it, the reason of speeds and
slowness which is found in Spinoza appears to be contrary to a thought which
rests on the account of substance or essence.
As it appears, Being to Deleuze and
Guattari is contrary to becoming, they tell us that ‘Being expresses in a
single meaning all that differs’, and that they’re opposed to the ‘unity of
substance’ and open up to an ‘infinity of the modifications that are part of
one another on this unique plane of life’[45].
As I understand this, there is an idea here that Western thought subordinates
this idea of becoming to the prioritised status of being. It is on the premise
of Spinoza (who Deleuze recognises as a philosopher of difference), that
becoming can operate without falling back or relying on traditional
philosophical structures.
Part 3: Memories of a Spinozist (II); Affects.
Braidotti continues to address
Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming (which I contend is further developed with his
collaboration with Guattari), and given the implication of Spinoza as discussed
above, Braidotti writes:
The process of
becoming is collectively driven, that is to say relational and external; it is
also framed by affectivity or desire, and is thus eccentric to rational
control.[46]
The second premise that Braidotti emphasises,
recognises the concept of affect which is also found in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Following
the relation of speed and slowness or movement and rest of an infinity of
parts, there corresponds intensities that affect them. Braidotti identifies a
consideration of ‘rational control’, which I take to relate to structuralism,
essentialism or the privilege of being in Western discourse. Deleuze and Guattari
start from the question; what can a body do?[47]
Spinoza tells us in part three of Ethics; Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects, that affect as he
understands it is the affections of the body, of which is the body’s power is
increased or diminished (IID3)[48].
Spinoza writes at IIp12 that the ‘body is affected with a mode that involves
the nature of that external body […] the body is affected with modes that
increase or aid its power of acting’[49].
Affects are the desires or
sensations of which arise in the body as a result of experience, affects
determine our actions and behaviour[50].
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of affect avoids a discussion of the body by
species or genus characteristics, which they go on to call an ‘ethology’, they
write;
[…] and this
[ethology] is the sense in which Spinoza wrote a true Ethics[51].
Deleuze and Guattari recognise the
potential of affects as being the basic unit of experience in nonhuman animals,
and express this in the example of the tick. Deleuze and Guattari tell us that
the tick, which becomes habitual to the tip of a branch, and of which is
sensitive to the smell of mammals, lets itself fall onto said mammal and digs
into its skin when one passes beneath the branch. They go onto write that the
tick has just three affects;
The rest of the
time the tick sleeps […] its degree of power [which is] indeed bounded by two
limits: the optimal limit of the feast after which it dies, and the pessimal
limit of the fast as it waits.[52]
Following the discussion of
ethology, Deleuze and Guattari are interested here in what a body can do,
suggesting that we know nothing of the body until we know what its affects are.
Deleuze and Guattari continue following the account of affects, that to become
is not to progress or regress along a series. Becomings are not dreams, they do
not occur in the imagination but are ‘perfectly real’[53].
Becomings or the block of becoming, produces ‘nothing other than itself’[54],
it has no teleological result, it is endurance. For a becoming to be real,
Deleuze and Guattari strip it of imitation, in their example of Freud’s case
study on ‘Little Hans’, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that there is no question
of the child ‘playing’ horse, but it is a question of whether or not Little
Hans can ‘endow his own elements with the relations of movements and rest, the
affects, that would make it become horse’[55].
If we look to Bergson’s expression
of becoming which appears in Creative
Evolution, becoming is thought in terms of real duration[56],
activity is fitted into the material world, in which matter appears to us as a
‘perceptual flowing’[57].
Our becoming, according to Bergson, is qualitative[58],
it is not spatialised distinctions which are quantified, but varied differences
of states. However, there is an implication of a hidden flow which is likened
to a cinematograph. Bergson uses the metaphor to instruct us that like the
contrivance of the cinematograph, we take snapshots of passing reality. The
cinematograph, which is correlated to our knowledge, imitates what there is
that is characteristic in this becoming itself, Bergson implies a secondary or
virtual becoming which is added onto being. He tells us:
Whether we would
think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else
than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us.[59]
Bergson, I maintain, explains that
the flow of experience, action or images we posit are run through a centre
which organises it all. However, Deleuze and Guattari invert this notion and
insist upon an immanence of the flow[60],
as we have seen above, becomings are not imitation. They are a composition of
speeds and affects on the plane of consistency. The implication of the affect
here is that it is the reality of the becoming, according to Deleuze and
Guattari, are the drive in a person which represents nothing[61].
The implication, to bring this back around to the posthuman exposition, is that
Deleuze and Guattari’s ethology does not reduce the subject to any hierarchy,
identity or normality. Ethology, accordingly is anti-anthropocentricism, it
does not position the integrity of human identity as a central power, rather,
it looks at the relations into which bodies enter the world[62].
What are the implications of the
philosophy of becoming that Deleuze and Guattari develop and how does it
reposition the human subject so that we can consider the posthuman condition
that Braidotti expresses? Through a reading of Spinoza which is attributed to
Bergson’s supposition on becoming, allows Deleuze and Guattari to define a body
and its material elements on the relations of movement and rest and the
capacity for its intensive affects which is capable of a given power[63].
In conclusion, following my premise
of relating this conception to the posthuman condition, Deleuze and Guattari as
I have indicated prioritise becoming over the substantiation of being. Given
their criticism of psychoanalysis and structuralism (which is arched between
their earlier text Anti-Oedipus as part of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes),
allows us to understand how the implication of a dissolution of the human
subject is implied in the philosophy of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari write
that psychoanalysis ‘has no feeling for unnatural participations’, its aim is
to stabilise intensive forces such as affects. Becoming punctures the limits of
striation and opens out to a reality which is not homogenised by structuralism
(or psychoanalysis, following Deleuze and Guattari’s account), Deleuze and
Guattari write:
Structuralism
represents a great revolution; the whole world becomes more rational.[64]
Following this, they consider structuralism
(which constitutes psychoanalytic discourse) as requiring tools and apparatuses
to annul the organs; to ‘shut them away so that their liberated elements can
enter into the new relations’. Therefore, we can assume that the philosophy of
becoming (along with its Spinozist complacencies) is likewise withdrawn through
the inscription of structuralism[65].
A homogenisation of intensive becomings restricts the ‘circulations of affects’[66].
Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, which
I have discussed, sets the premise of becoming through its decentring of
recollection in relation to ontology. I believe that the trajectory from a slip
or a break of the philosophy of being, to Deleuze and Guattari’s development in
the philosophy of becoming which places emphasis on the inhuman relations to
life, can satisfy the condition of the posthuman. Following Braidotti’s text,
we can see how becoming rethinks the emergence of life, rather than replace it
with another structure or model to annul the intensities. Through becoming, the
body remains in constant flux, as Braidotti explained, the Deleuzean body is
enfleshed meat which comes into action or is activated by waves of desire. The Deleuzean
body is not restricted to a model of structuralism, but is a becoming-hybrid[67],
and as such collapses the foundations which return the body to a homogenous
state of being.
References
Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter and memory.
1st ed. Nottinghamshire: Martino Publishing.
Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory.
1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Colebrook, C. (2002). Gilles
Deleuze. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. 1st ed.
London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Spinoza, B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics. 1st ed. London:
Penguin.
Websites
Iep.utm.edu. (2017). Spinoza, Benedict de:
Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [online] Available at:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/spinoz-m/#H1
[1] Buchanan,
I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and
Feminist Theory. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p 158
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Ibid.
[4] Herbrechter,
S. (2013). Posthumanism. 1st ed.
London: Bloomsbury Academic. p 37
[5] Gontarski,
S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding
Deleuze, Understanding modernism. 1st ed. New York: Bloomsbury. p 253
[6] Deleuze,
G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.
1st ed. New York: Zone Books. p 8
[7] Buchanan,
I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and
Feminist Theory p 159
[8] Deleuze,
G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.
p 8
[9] Buchanan,
I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and
Feminist Theory p 159
[10]
ibid
[11] Bergson,
H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter
and memory. 1st ed. Nottinghamshire: Martino Publishing. p 191
[12]
Ibid p 193
[13]
Ibid p 177
[14]
Ibid p 194
[15] Gontarski,
S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding
Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 26
[16]
Ibid p 198
[17] Bergson,
H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter
and memory. p 211 (fig. 5)
[18]
ibid p 211
[19]
ibid p 197
[20]
ibid p 179
[21]
ibid
[22]
ibid p 173
[23] Bergson,
H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter
and memory. p 196
[24] Deleuze,
G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.
p 54
[25]
ibid p 56
[26] Bergson,
H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter
and memory. p 171
[27] Deleuze,
G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.
p 57
[28] Gontarski,
S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding
Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 26
[29] Deleuze,
G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.
p 57
[30] Gontarski,
S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding
Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 253
[31] Deleuze,
G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.
p 37
[32] Buchanan,
I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and
Feminist Theory 165
[33] Gontarski,
S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding
Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 253
[34] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand
plateaus. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic p 296
[35] Spinoza,
B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics. 1st
ed. London: Penguin. p 43
[36]
ibid p 4
[37] Spinoza,
B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics p 7
[38] Lord,
B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. 1st ed. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press. p 61
[39] Iep.utm.edu.
(2017). Spinoza, Benedict de: Metaphysics
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/spinoz-m/#H1 [Accessed 11 Apr. 2017].
[40] Spinoza,
B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics p 42
[41]
Ibid.
[42]
Ibid.
[43]
Ibid. p 43
[44] Adkins,
B. (2015). Deleuze and Guattari's "A
thousand plateaus". 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p
141
[45] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand
plateaus. p 297
[46] Buchanan,
I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and
Feminist Theory p 170
[47] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand
plateaus. p 299
[48] Spinoza,
B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics p 70
[49]
Ibid p 78
[50] Lord,
B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. p 83
[51] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand
plateaus. p 299
[52]
ibid p 300
[53]
ibid p 277
[54]
Ibid.
[55]
ibid p 301
[56] Bergson,
H. (1911). Creative Evolution. 3rd
ed. New York: Greenwood Printing. p 324
[57]
ibid p 330
[58]
ibid
[59] Bergson,
H. (1911). Creative Evolution p 332
[60] Colebrook,
C. (2002). Gilles Deleuze. 1st ed.
London: Routledge. p 128
[61] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand
plateaus. p 303
[62] Colebrook,
C. (2002). Gilles Deleuze p 128
[63]
Ibid p 304
[64] Deleuze,
G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand
plateaus. p 276
[65]
Ibid p 303
[66]
Ibid.
[67] Colebrook,
C. (2002). Gilles Deleuze p 129
